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Articles
FREEDOM OF DRESS: STATE AND PRIVATE REGULATION OF
CLOTHING, HAIRSTYLE, JEWELRY, MAKEUP,
TATTOOS, AND PIERCING
GOWRI RAMACHANDRAN*
This Article proposes a legal right to free dress, encompassing
clothing, hair, jewelry, makeup, tattoo, and piercing choices.  Neither
speech rights nor equal protection provide an accurate account of the
importance of self-presentation; instead a new theory of freedom of
dress is needed, drawing on its unique location at the blurry border
of the personal (as an exercise of control over the physical self) and
the political and cultural (as the performance of social identity).
Four of the most important applications of this theory are found in
public schools, private workplaces, prisons, and direct state regula-
tion.  These settings require different balances of individual appear-
ance choices against other interests.
In the workplace, employers should be required to reasonably ac-
commodate employees’ dress choices.  Even in the absence of a distinct
statutory right, conceiving of freedom of dress as a fundamental right
would make viable disparate impact and “sex-plus” claims affecting
dress under Title VII.  On the street, the paucity of important coun-
tervailing state interests supports reviewing infringements on the free-
dom of dress with strict scrutiny and subjecting them to narrow
tailoring requirements—rather than treating dress merely as an ad-
junct to speech.  In schools, too, strict scrutiny is appropriate; carv-
ing out freedom of dress as a liberty for students may be easier even
than carving out student liberties like speech.  In prisons, a reasona-
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ble accommodation approach is appropriate, but with a much nar-
rower construction of reasonable accommodation than in other
settings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of dress is the right to choose the hairstyle, makeup,
clothing, shoes, head coverings, tattoos, jewelry, and other adorn-
ments that make up the public image of our sometimes private per-
sons.  These deeply personal yet often highly public choices are a site
at which the adage, “[t]he personal is political,”1 rings extremely true.
I use the word “site” in more than a metaphorical sense: The items
with which we cover our bodies and the ways in which we style them
are physically located at the border—a manipulable border—between
our bodies and the rest of the world.  They are how we “make the
human body culturally visible.”2
Many litigants have argued for legal recognition of such a right,3
and many of us have felt that we do or should possess it to one degree
or another.  Some of the framers of the Bill of Rights thought it so
clear we have such a right that they considered it unnecessary to name
it.4  Almost all of us have, at some point in our lives, felt as if we were
1. “The personal is political” was coined by members of New York Radical Women,
including Carol Hanisch, in the late 1960s. JENNIFER BAUMGARDNER & AMY RICHARDS,
MANIFESTA 19 (2000).
2. Elizabeth Wilson & Amy de la Haye, Introduction to DEFINING DRESS 1, 2 (Amy de la
Haye & Elizabeth Wilson eds., 1999) (quoting Kaja Silverman, Fragments of a Fashionable
Discourse, in STUDIES IN ENTERTAINMENT: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO MASS CULTURE 145
(Tania Modleski ed., 1986)).
3. See cases cited infra Parts IV–VII.
4. During lengthy debates over whether the right of assembly should be included in
the Bill of Rights, some Framers argued that it was unnecessary to include it because it was
so clear that the right could not be infringed by a government.  Congressman Theodore
Sedgwick of Massachusetts analogized freedom of assembly to freedom of personal appear-
ance to make his point:
If the committee were governed by that general principle . . . they might have
declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased . . . but [I] would
ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to enter these trifles in a dec-
laration of rights, in a Government where none of them were intended to be infringed.
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251–52 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 54–55
(1965)).  I include this bit of history not to make an originalist argument about the free-
dom of dress, but rather to dispel the idea that freedom of dress is somehow so radical as
to be irreconcilable with American traditions.
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pressured, if not forced, to alter the way we present ourselves, whether
by a parent, potential employer, teacher, or some other more vague
force, such as a social more.  And this feeling that freedom of dress is
important is not new.  In 1836, early in the American feminist move-
ment, at the same time that women’s rights activists fought for the
rights to vote and have jobs, they fought for the right “to wear sensible
clothes.”5
The extent of, or limitations on, freedom of dress affects each
one of us every single day.  Yet scholars to date have failed to theorize
it fully as a legal issue.  As a result of this neglect, we have no adequate
theory of what its legally enforced and enforceable contours should
be, and we have little respect for and affirmation of its value.
Instead of seeing dress theorized as a unique right, we usually see
scholarship that theorizes dress in terms of equality,6 or in terms of
other, related rights, such as freedom of speech.7  As for litigation,
plaintiffs are usually successful only when they are able to claim that
5. KARLYNE ANSPACH, THE WHY OF FASHION 329 (1967) (internal quotation marks
omitted).  Feminists at this time started a movement called Bloomerism, referring to the
baggy pants worn by feminist activist Mrs. Elizabeth Smith Miller and championed in the
journal The Lily by Mrs. Dexter Bloomer. Id. at 330.
6. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1262, 1293–98 (2000) (discussing the effects of identity performance on antidis-
crimination law in the context of employment); Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri
Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION STORIES 105 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) [hereinafter Carbado et al., The Jespersen
Story] (questioning whether the forced wearing of makeup can form the basis of a sex
discrimination suit); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623,
646 (2005) (describing work cultures that discriminate on the basis of appearance);
Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future
of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1199–1202 (2004) (noting that Title VII was passed in
an effort to further realize certain Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees);
Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 780–81 (2002) (identifying a contemporary
form of discrimination as “enforced covering”).
7. E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the School-
house Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527–30 (2000) (analyzing Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), as a speech case and
arguing that it has effectively been overturned by later cases); Todd A. DeMitchell, School
Uniforms and the Constitution: Common Dress in an Uncommon Time, 156 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 5–6
(2001) (analyzing school uniforms and dress codes as First Amendment issues although
noting that dress and speech were distinguished from each other in Tinker because the
Supreme Court characterized the black armbands at issue as “pure speech”); Gil
Grantmore, Lex and the City, 91 GEO. L.J. 913, 913 (2003) (arguing that “fashion is
speech”); Andrew D.M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 BAYLOR
L. REV. 623, 627 (2002) (analyzing Tinker, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986), and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), as the student
speech “trilogy”).
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their dress and appearance choices are actually political speech,8 re-
ligious expression,9 or limited in an explicitly discriminatory manner,
such as by a sex-specific appearance regulation.10  Even in the latter
case, these plaintiffs are rarely successful.11
Sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and cultural theorists
have long recognized that fashion and other forms of manipulating
appearance play a unique role in the development of the individual as
a member of society—the negotiation and formation of the public
self.  Writers from Charlotte Perkins Gilman12 to Roland Barthes13 to
8. E.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505–06 (holding that a student’s decision to wear a black
armband to school to protest the Vietnam War was protected speech); People v. Craft, 509
N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1013 (Rochester City Ct. 1986), rev’d, 564 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Monroe County Ct.
1991), rev’d sub nom. People v. Santorelli, 600 N.E.2d 232, 234 (N.Y. 1992) (finding that
women who went topless to protest sexist laws could not be charged under a New York
criminal statute aimed at topless waitresses).
9. E.g., Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1002 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
California Department of Corrections’s hair grooming policy violated the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 because it imposed a substantial burden on a
Native American inmate’s religious practice and was not the least restrictive alternative
available to achieve the prison’s interests in safety and security); Craddick v. Duckworth,
113 F.3d 83, 85 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a prison regulation forbidding a medicine
bag from being worn under clothing violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act);
Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 576–77 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding under Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78 (1987), that an alternative means exists to accommodate Rastafarian inmates’
First Amendment religious rights without undermining reasonable security concerns);
Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730, 731–32 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding under Turner that grooming
regulations that prevent religious prisoners from keeping their beards infringed on in-
mates’ practice of religion).
10. E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that a woman who was denied partnership in part because she failed to walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, and wear makeup, jewelry, and softer-hued suits was a
victim of sex discrimination under Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th
Cir. 2004) (finding that a pre-operative transsexual employee who had been suspended for
his gender nonconforming appearance stated a claim of discrimination under Title VII);
Williams v. City of Fort Worth, 782 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding that an ordi-
nance forbidding women but not men from being topless violated the Texas Equal Rights
Amendment), overruled by Schleuter v. City of Fort Worth, 947 S.W.2d 920, 925 (Tex. App.
1997).
11. E.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1112–13 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (upholding a casino’s policy that prohibited male beverage servers from wearing
makeup and required women beverage servers to wear multiple forms of makeup); Foun-
tain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755 (9th Cir. 1977) (upholding a policy that
required men, but not women, to wear ties); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507
F.2d 1084, 1087–88 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (upholding a policy permitting females to
wear their hair at any length, but limiting the length of males’ hair); State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d
551, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting women,
but not men, from being topless in public passed intermediate scrutiny and was
constitutional).
12. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, THE DRESS OF WOMEN (Michael R. Hill & Mary Jo
Deegan eds., 2002).
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Umberto Eco14 have commented on the meaning of dress: what it sig-
nifies and how it structures our experiences.  The law is starting to
take account of this meaning, but even as restrictions on appearance
choices are challenged, those choices are usually not theorized as a
socially and individually valuable life activity in its own right.  Instead,
they are characterized in terms of other rights, justifications for which
scholars have endlessly explored: In the workplace, dress is often char-
acterized as constitutive of racial, gender, or other identity, and there-
fore minimally protected by antidiscrimination law;15 in the public
square, as well as in elementary and secondary schools, it is character-
ized as a form of speech-like “expression” protected by First Amend-
ment law;16 and in prisons, it is sometimes characterized as protected
religious expression.17  To be sure, some litigants have been able to
describe it as engaging in a liberty protected by substantive due pro-
cess, and some of these litigants have prevailed.18  Nevertheless, for
the most part scholars have failed to explore that liberty and where it
might come from to the extent they have explored liberties such as
privacy, about which entire textbooks have been written.19  Courts
that have recognized the right have explored its origins very little, if at
13. ROLAND BARTHES, THE FASHION SYSTEM (Matthew Ward & Richard Howard trans.,
Univ. of Cal. Press 1990) (1967).
14. UMBERTO ECO, Lumbar Thought, in TRAVELS IN HYPERREALITY 191, 191–95 (William
Weaver trans., Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1986) (1967) (characterizing clothes as semiotic
devices).
15. Compare cases cited supra note 10 with cases cited supra note 11. R
16. See cases cited supra note 8. R
17. Compare cases cited supra note 9 (upholding religious prisoners’ personal- R
appearance rights), with Hill v. Estelle, 537 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding
that sex-differentiated appearance standards for prisoners did not violate equal protec-
tion), Star v. Gramley, 815 F. Supp. 276 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (holding that prohibiting cross-
dressing and wearing makeup did not violate constitutional rights of prisoner), Lamb v.
Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986) (holding that a transsexual prisoner has no
constitutional right to gendered clothing), and Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-
5204, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1716, at *6–8 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997) (per curiam) (permit-
ting segregated confinement of a male-to-female transsexual prisoner for her refusal to
follow orders to wear a brassiere, and holding that failure to provide her “with hair and
skin products that she claims are necessary for her to maintain a feminine appearance” was
part of routine deprivation in prison).
18. E.g., DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1369–70 (11th Cir. 1987)
(upholding the right of a man to jog shirtless); Miller v. Ackerman, 488 F.2d 920, 922 (8th
Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (upholding the right of Marine Corps reservists to wear short-hair
wigs during weekend training that allowed them to comply with Marine Corps grooming
codes while preserving their longer hair when not on duty); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior Coll.,
470 F.2d 659, 664 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding the right of male college students to have
long hair).
19. E.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW (2003);
RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ANITA L. ALLEN, PRIVACY LAW (2d ed. 2002).
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all.20  Moreover, the Supreme Court has never addressed the subject,
denying certiorari in the face of a circuit split,21 and once assuming
without deciding that a liberty interest in grooming and dress exists.22
As a result, the Court, too, has sidestepped the question of the origins,
contours, and importance of the freedom of dress.
The rhetoric of rights is disfavored in many circles, as it is associ-
ated with an individualistic, libertarian understanding of freedom that
treats the state with undue fear and the individual as existing in a
vacuum, as opposed to a more communitarian understanding of what
freedom means.23  But rights do not have to be conceived of solely in
this way,24 and the conception of the freedom of dress that I offer is a
more balanced one, fulfilled not only by the state refraining from reg-
ulation of self-presentation in public realms, but also via positively act-
ing in the private realm of the workplace.25  Moreover, this
conception of freedom of dress explains why its protection in a setting
like the workplace or a school may be appropriate even where protec-
tion of rights such as speech may not be appropriate.26
A word about what I am not doing is necessary here.  I am not
making an argument that the freedom of dress is already protected by
law, either constitutional or statutory.  Indeed, I will essentially reject
that argument by explaining how established areas of law, such as
traditional antidiscrimination law and free speech law, even taken in
the aggregate, will not work as an appropriate protection of the free-
dom of dress.  Instead, I am proposing that we protect the freedom of
dress, and I am providing the theory behind that proposal.
I do not answer here how the proposal should be accomplished.
Should judges uniformly find freedom of dress somewhere in the
20. See, e.g., Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 164–66 (Alaska 1972) (summarizing the
various rationales given by courts for recognizing a constitutional right to control one’s
personal appearance).
21. Olff v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1045–46 & nn.6–7 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
22. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1976) (assuming that “there is some sort of
liberty interest” in matters of personal appearance within the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. See ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE 72–73 (2003) (discussing the alienating
effect of a democracy’s emphasis on individual rights rather than community ideals).
24. See Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights,
22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404–05, 424–27 (1987) (discussing the benefits of “rights-
assertion” for minorities and the poor and urging the expansion of rights-entitlement);
WEST, supra note 23, at 92 (proposing the revitalization of the rights tradition with the aim R
of constructing liberal rights that protect and guarantee “good society” ideals: “[A] society
in which . . . citizens possess those fundamental capabilities which are themselves essential
to the enjoyment of a fully human life”).
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part III.E.
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Constitution?  Should we pass an amendment to the Constitution?
Should Congress enact a statute?  When it comes to private work-
places, should we direct our energies at the states, many of which have
stronger protections for worker rights than the federal government?
The answers to these questions depend on one’s beliefs about consti-
tutional methodology, the competence of the various branches and
levels of government (local, state, and federal) to accomplish these
goals, and, of course, political realities.  Instead of answering these
questions, I am simply arguing that we should have freedom of dress,
and that the law should treat it as a unique right with its own particu-
larities.  In later parts of this Article, I will explain how that might play
out by proposing what the legal construct protecting freedom of dress
in various contexts should look like.
I am also not arguing that my theory of why we should have a
right to freedom of dress is necessarily applicable to other countries
and societies.  The theory I provide depends a great deal both on the
fact that America is a capitalist country and that fashion has great
meaning in Western societies.27  Thus, I do not imply that if another
country’s treatment of the freedom of dress differed from the one I
propose, it would necessarily not be a “free” country or a true democ-
racy.  Nor do I even imply that America is not a “real” democracy un-
less and until it adopts my proposal.  Rather, I argue that in this age,
recognizing the freedom of dress protects the ability of Americans to
continually change and reconstruct their identities—their political
values and cultural values.  Freedom of dress promotes a society whose
norms, politics, and laws are constructed by an engaged people,
rather than by orthodoxy.
Failure to explore freedom of dress as a unique right prevents us
from gaining a complete and coherent understanding of what it is we
are really doing when we get a tattoo, style and color our hair, get
dressed in the morning, choose to wear certain kinds of makeup, put
on jewelry ranging from delicate to punk, or wear a uniform.  Without
that understanding, we fail to approach the regulation of this behav-
ior in various contexts—schools, prisons, on the street, and in the
workplace—with a coherent sense of what interests are at play and
ought to be balanced.  Indeed, recent efforts to conceive of self-
presentation solely from an antidiscrimination perspective have left a
number of very creative scholars unable to formulate coherent, princi-
pled rules of law protecting this activity.28  Armed with a deeper un-
27. See infra Part III.
28. E.g., Green, supra note 6, at 676 (discussing legal deficiencies in addressing a cul- R
ture of discrimination in the workplace); Yoshino, supra note 6, at 875–79 (addressing the R
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derstanding of the freedom of dress, especially what makes it unique,
we could better approach the difficult questions of how this activity
should be protected in various spheres, including on the street, in
schools, in prisons, or in the workplace.29
This Article initiates that exploration.  First I explain why con-
verting the very anti-essentialist, post-structuralist insight—personal
appearance choices can be performances of race, gender, sexual ori-
entation, and other identity categories—into a subject of traditional
antidiscrimination law is misguided.30  Deciding which performances
we will count as “equivalent” to group identity—Do black women
wearing cornrows count?  What about white women wearing cornrows,
or black women dying their hair blonde?—institutionalizes essential-
ism.  Moreover, since many behaviors—from reading a magazine to
being a prima donna—could be identity performative, more may be
necessary to justify legal protection of such a behavior.  These
problems do much to explain why most scholars writing about the
subject have refrained from proposing specific legal rules.
Next, I provide a better theory of the importance of freedom of
dress.31  In brief, I argue that personal appearance choices play a
unique and crucial role in the development and revision of a simulta-
neously public and personal identity—the foundation for the exercise
of an array of other rights, such as religious and political beliefs, and
choice of job or friends.  Although law cannot, and should not, pursue
eradication of the cultural norms that influence our identities, law can
create a zone in which to better empower individuals to form and
reform identity, promoting a dynamic, rather than static, culture and
society.  Personal appearance choices are a primary site of an individ-
ual’s confrontation with her separation from and identification with
others in society.  These choices are important and unique in that this
confrontation occurs on the visible borders of the physical self.  This
highlights why thinking of personal appearance choices solely as
speech and art is inadequate.  The speech theory of dress ignores its
challenges of the antidiscrimination schism); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear
Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 2541, 2568–69, 2579–82 (1994) (proposing a principle for judging the validity of
appearance requirements—whether they disadvantage women—but admitting that the
principle is problematic to apply, and providing no resolution of this problem).
29. Of course, there are many other contexts in which one could grapple with whether
and how freedom of dress can be regulated, such as military service and other forms of
public employment or attorney appearances in court.  But not all can be exhausted in one
paper.
30. See infra Part II.A–B.
31. See infra Part III.
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subjective form: the fact that personal appearance choices are inher-
ently personal, by nature of the medium of dress.  The experience of
freedom of dress choices as exercises of control over the body makes
personal appearance manipulation an excellent zone of identity ex-
ploration for law to protect.
Third, I apply the fruits of this exploration to four different legal
contexts—the private workplace, the street or public square, public
schools, and prisons—in order to demonstrate how conceiving of free-
dom of dress as a right and understanding its unique nature might
affect the approach to its regulation in these contexts.  In stark con-
trast with the workplace-equality approach based on identity politics
that has recently garnered considerable attention, I propose protect-
ing freedom of dress via a reasonable accommodation framework.  I
also explain how, even in the absence of such statutory change, under-
standing freedom of dress as an important right would affect Title VII
challenges to restrictions on dress by making “sex-plus,” “race-plus,”
and disparate impact claims viable. On the street, I propose giving
freedom of dress the status we give rights deemed “fundamental.”  In
schools, I propose strong protection for student exercises of the free-
dom of dress, stronger perhaps even than speech.  In prisons, I pro-
pose a reasonable accommodation framework, but acknowledge that a
fair assessment of what accommodations are “reasonable” and what
hardships are “undue” would lead to far less freedom of dress for pris-
oners than workers.
Finally, I conclude the Article with a plea to start treating the
freedom of dress seriously, not just because of its race, sex, gender,
and religious saliency and not just because it is a kind of speech or art.
Instead, it is time to start taking it seriously in its own right.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE EQUALITY APPROACH
In the modern world, many persons have felt that their hairstyle,
clothing, fashion sensibility, makeup, body piercings, tattoos, and/or
partial or full nudity is important to them.  In this Section, I explore
one of the main legal theories currently occupying the field of
thought about freedom of dress and explain why it is inadequate.
Several legal scholars have recently drawn on a crucial insight of
post-structuralist theory—much of our identity, such as our race, gen-
der, or sexual orientation, is not wholly immutable.32  Rather, our
identities are either wholly or partially “performative,” meaning that
they are constituted not just by immutable, biological traits but also by
32. See sources cited supra note 6. R
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our actions, such as the sexual acts we engage in, the way we wear our
hair, the way we speak, our clothing, and even the magazines we like
to read.33  Thus, when an African-American woman wears her hair in
braids, this act is usually part of what constitutes her status as an Afri-
can-American woman.
These scholars, including myself, have applied this insight to in-
terrogate the law’s distinction between discriminating against an Afri-
can-American woman because of the color of her skin and shape of
her genitals and, on the other hand, discriminating against her be-
cause of the way she wears her hair.  It is, after all, largely her outward
appearance and behavior—certainly not the shape of her genitals—
that signals to most people who interact with her that she is a woman,
and that at least partially signals her identity as an African American.
Denying her the ability to wear her hair in traditionally African-Ameri-
can styles, such as cornrows, is a means of forcing assimilation to the
appearance norms of the dominant racial group.34  Thus, many schol-
ars have begun to question antidiscrimination law’s limitation to pro-
tecting seemingly immutable aspects of identity and its corresponding
failure to protect performative aspects of identity.
Dress is a common aspect of identity performance and, for the
most part, theories of freedom from discrimination promote govern-
ment intrusion into private realms to combat discrimination.35  Thus,
it may be appealing to think of freedom of dress, especially in the
private workplace, solely in terms of traditional, equality-based antidis-
crimination law.
A. Ascribing Stable Categories to Unstable Practices: Antidiscrimination
Law Turns Post-Structuralism into Essentialism
Antidiscrimination law is not the best law for protecting identity
performance such as dress.36  Scholars outside the legal academy who
33. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 6, at 865–75 (discussing performative models of R
identity).
34. See Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 390–93 (stating that forced alteration of hairstyle is a form of
assimilation).
35. For instance, the prohibition on private workplace discrimination on the basis of
race in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was in part justified on the grounds that rights in the
public realm such as voting are not meaningful in the absence of protection from discrimi-
nation in the private realm. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, pt. 2, at 26 (1963), reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2513 (“The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an
empty stomach. . . .  The principle of equal treatment under law can have little meaning if
in practice its benefits are denied the citizen.”).
36. Here, I am most directly disagreeing with Katharine Bartlett, who has argued
against protecting choice in matters of workplace appearance and in favor of a principle
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most famously have articulated the theory that identity is performative
have made clear that the reading of an identity performance is highly
contextual and complicated, and often rather counterintuitive.  For
instance, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick has described the unexpected per-
sonal experience of appearing very femme upon becoming bald after
cancer treatment.37  Judith Butler has written an entire article, Imita-
tion and Gender Insubordination, describing how activities like drag or
butch-femme lesbian behavior can, rather than reify gender stereo-
types by imitating them, actually subvert those stereotypes by de-natu-
ralizing them and disassociating them from a system of compulsory
heterosexuality.38  These activities might seem to “buy in” to tradi-
tional models of gender identity and, indeed, some feminists have crit-
icized them for doing so; yet, these activities can also be read as
undermining and mocking the natural, fixed status of gender catego-
ries by exposing the manner in which they are performed.39
The wearing of cornrows or dreadlocks by an African-American
woman may not have the same meaning as the wearing of the same
hairstyle by a white woman.  On a white woman it may be culturally
meaningless, culturally insensitive, or exoticizing.  On the other hand,
it may express a respect for and solidarity with African-American wo-
men.  Or it may express the fact that the woman we thought was white
is in fact, like many people, of mixed racial heritage.
When a lawyer wears makeup, high heels, and a skirt, she might
be performing a normative, heterosexual identity at work or, as Kenji
Yoshino has described it, “reverse cover[ing].”40  But without chang-
ing a single aspect of her appearance, she may transform the meaning
of that performance simply by going to a lesbian bar after work, where
that attacks dress regulations that disadvantage women.  Bartlett, supra note 28, at 2548–50, R
2568–71.
37. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, “Gosh, Boy George, You Must Be Awfully Secure in Your Mascu-
linity!,” in CONSTRUCTING MASCULINITY 11, 18 (Maurice Berger et al. eds., 1995).
So far so good, I thought; I had always been attracted to very butch women, and
now, it seemed to me, by some miracle, I was going to get to turn into one. . . .
What emerged over time, however, . . . was something else: that what I had
become visible as was, in fact (no big surprises here), quite femme.  The surprise
was in seeing that it required the crossing over a threshold of, precisely, butch-
ness, to become visible as, precisely, if it is precisely, femme.  That is to say, I had
to stumble my way onto a map of sexy gender-y-ness in the first place; and the
portal to that place, for women, or for lesbians, or for queers, or just for me, I do
not know yet, is marked “butch.”
Id. at 18.
38. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER 307 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993).
39. Id. at 313–14.
40. Yoshino, supra note 6, at 780. R
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her ultra-femme look might take on an ironic meaning or signify par-
ticipation in the lesbian butch-femme culture—a practice which is not
only not normative, but is, like drag, deeply subversive of normative
gender identities.41  And what if she is out of the closet at work?  What
if her coworkers know that she is a lesbian and know that she dresses
in an ultra-femme manner?  Is she “covering” her lesbian identity,
making it easy for her coworkers to disattend it?  Perhaps.  But she
might also be doing something rather subversive with her dress, even
“flaunting” her femme role-playing behavior.42  She may even be hav-
ing it both ways: “flaunting” her femme lesbian identity to coworkers
who get it and “covering” her lesbian identity to coworkers who don’t
get it.
The fact that identity performance is so contextual and complex
makes it hard, if not impossible, to formulate legal rules for protecting
identity performance under the traditional equality-based rubrics of
antidiscrimination law.  To do so would require isolating which iden-
tity performances constitute the performance of a protected identity
category and which do not,43 or, as Bartlett proposes, deciding which
identity performances disadvantage women.44  This is a task that is not
only difficult, but one that risks turning good intentions into racist or
sexist essentialist assertions.45  Deciding which actions do and do not
“count” as part of a protected identity will inevitably privilege the
claims of those who behave in conformance with dominant group
norms over the claims of those who are dissenters: Painting a red dot
in the center of my forehead would most likely “count” as a perform-
ance of my ethnicity and gender (South Asian woman), but dyeing my
hair red would most likely not “count.”  This trades the orthodoxy of
41. Butler, supra note 38, at 318. R
42. See generally LESBIANS, LEVIS AND LIPSTICK: THE MEANING OF BEAUTY IN OUR LIVES
(Jeanine C. Cogan & Joanie M. Erickson eds., 1999).
43. See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument
About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 386–93 (2006) (categorizing ways in which
employers engage in trait discrimination and suggesting specific legal responses to each
category, including models, such as the use of expert witnesses, for how plaintiffs should go
about proving that a trait is associated with a protected category under Title VII).
44. Even Bartlett acknowledges that applying the principle she proposes is problem-
atic. See Bartlett, supra note 28, at 2571–72 (describing situations in which it is difficult to R
decide if a rule disadvantages women, such as a requirement that Shannon Faulkner shave
her head at the Citadel, or a hypothetical rule that both men and women must wear high
heels, skirts, and makeup). But see Yuracko, supra note 43, at 386–93 (discussing ways in R
which plaintiffs can prove trait discrimination).
45. See, e.g., Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2003) (re-
jecting a bus driver’s equal protection claim that being asked to wear pants required her to
dress “masculinely” because it would perpetuate the very stereotypes that courts were
meant to combat using the Equal Protection Clause).
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assimilation for the orthodoxy of identity politics.46  Wearing a dot on
your forehead—that is what it means to be a South Asian woman—is
therefore good.  Having a flashy hair color—that is not what it means
to be a South Asian woman—is therefore not good.  Yet in many con-
texts—the legal academy, an Indian restaurant, a new age book-
store—dyeing my hair red is most likely a deeper challenge to the
cultural practices and values of those surrounding me than would be
wearing a red dot.
Expanding the idea of legal equality to include identity perform-
ance is problematic.  As such, most legal scholars writing in the field
have carefully refrained from articulating specific legal rules for pro-
tecting identity performance.  Nevertheless, they have been chal-
lenged as promoting essentialism.47  Ironically, the theory that
identity is performative is deeply anti-essentialist.48  Why then, does
even the beginnings of a project of translating it into law get criticized
as essentialism?  Because the particular translation intimated—one in
which a strict equivalence is drawn between behavior and race, gen-
der, sexual orientation, and any other protected “status”—is quite
dangerous, given the complex and contextual nature of identity
performance.
And yet, I do not argue that the lessons of post-structuralist the-
ory are unimportant to law.  To the contrary, I think they are deeply
important, and that is why I have written about them elsewhere.49
What I am arguing against is protecting identity performance under
the formal equality rubric of traditional antidiscrimination law, rather
than the rights-based rubric that I propose and detail in later Parts of
this Article.
B. Acknowledging Performativity Without Essentializing It: The Need for a
Different Rhetoric
Without certain essentialist moves to define which particular in-
stances of identity performance “count” as equivalent to identity for
purposes of antidiscrimination law, the theory of performative identity
46. See generally Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803
(2000) (discussing the politics of cultural identity).
47. See Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in Dis-
parate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2206–07 (2003) (criticizing Yoshino on an
anti-essentialist basis).
48. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990) (promoting practices that destabilize and subvert identity).
49. See generally Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Perform-
ance Demands are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299 (2005); Carbado et al.,
The Jespersen Story, supra note 6. R
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doesn’t say enough about what antidiscrimination law should do be-
cause it is too limitless.  Any aspect of behavior can be claimed as iden-
tity performance: not just hairstyle and clothing, but also harassment
of coworkers,50 using curse words,51 or speaking languages other than
English.52  It is a wonderful thing to use the fact that identity is
performative to interrogate restrictions on these behaviors in social
and cultural commentary.  It is an entirely different thing to protect
all of these behaviors as a matter of law.  To do so would be, frankly,
unworkable.  Law that protects identity performative behaviors must
create some limits without being essentialist.  Rights-based rhetoric,
rather than equality rhetoric, is incredibly useful for this purpose.
In my view, the fact that identity is performative is relevant to
dress and self-presentation because it helps us understand why that
behavior is important to human flourishing: It is often a deeply per-
sonal and political act, even when not easily linked by the observer to
a stable and protected identity category or to a particularized state-
ment, such as “I oppose the war.”  The fact that identity is performa-
tive helps explain why we should care about dress, an extremely
common site of both subversive and nonsubversive identity perform-
ance.  However, a performative theory of identity is simply not a com-
plete theory on which to base a legal approach, given the problem of
essentialism and the fact that everything we do can be understood as
identity performance.  Some scholars writing about identity perform-
ance have therefore given up on the ability of law to undo any of the
subordination they care about so deeply,53 and others are skeptical of
50. See, e.g., Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 741–42 (9th Cir. 2004) (employee
filed a religious discrimination claim after she was terminated by her employer for attempt-
ing to coerce a lesbian subordinate into renouncing her sexual orientation and living a
heterosexual life); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 601–02 (9th Cir. 2004)
(employee claimed religious discrimination and wrongful discharge after being terminated
for condemning lesbian and gay coworkers in furtherance of his religious practices and
beliefs).
51. Expletives are common in American hip hop music, leading it to be censored fre-
quently.  Wikipedia, Hip Hop Music, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hip_hop_music (last
visited Oct. 1, 2006).  While it may be controversial to claim that hip hop is a performance
of African-American identity, it is surely a claim with enough plausibility to present a seri-
ous factual question. See Wikipedia, Gangsta Rap, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gang-
sta_rap (last visited Oct. 1, 2006) (describing controversy over whether the subgenre of
gangsta rap accurately describes the life of inner city gang members or is better thought of
as a minstrel show).
52. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (Spanish-
speaking employees filed a lawsuit against their employer claiming that its English-only
policy violated Title VII); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
53. See, e.g., Green, supra note 6, at 629 (concluding that courts are unequipped to R
effectively deal with cultural discrimination in the workplace).
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the law’s power in this realm.54  In contrast, I am not skeptical of the
law per se, only of the type of law being imagined—an antidiscrimina-
tion law that protects against intentional discrimination based on
identity.
Instead, I argue for a rights-based approach, under which we are
not forced to pass judgment on the meaning, both internal and exter-
nal, of various identity performances, and under which only some types
of identity performances are afforded special legal status; I argue for a
freedom of dress.55  All kinds of manipulation of personal appear-
ance—not just those we think are performative of protected identi-
ties—will, under the rights-based approach, “count” and receive some
protection.  On the other hand, by isolating the freedom of dress as a
right, I limit the identity performative behaviors to which special pro-
tection will be afforded: Only those that are exercises of the freedom
of dress will count.  This creates a workable, principled, but non-
essentialist legal rule.
Why do I choose dress as the form of identity performance to
protect as a unique right?  Part III of this Article will theorize the
unique importance of dress.  However, for those concerned primarily
with identity performance by members of protected classes, I point
out that personal appearance is an extremely common site of identity
performance.  It is, in my view, preferable to secure some significant
rights to identity performative behaviors than to abandon the pros-
pects of law to provide protection at all.
C. Why Scholars Turned to Equality Rhetoric Instead of Rights Rhetoric
Why have academics largely ignored the rights-based possibility
for protecting personal appearance choices in private spheres?  It may
be because the academy is court-centric.  Thus, equality rhetoric gets
more attention than rights or freedom rhetoric when it comes to “pri-
vate” spheres like the workplace.  Because of the state action doctrine,
courts generally cannot step into a “private” arena like the workplace
and hold that an employer has infringed upon a personal liberty.
Only state actions can infringe a constitutional right under this doc-
54. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 6, at 781, 875–79 (contending that Title VII does not R
address trait discrimination).
55. In doing so, I am treating self-presentation much the way courts tend to treat relig-
ion—as a practice that they do not want to interrogate and become entangled with too
deeply. See, e.g., McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560–61 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding
that even to determine whether discrimination by a religious institution stems from relig-
ious doctrine would constitute an impermissible infringement on free exercise).
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trine; private actions or state inactions cannot.56  However, despite cri-
tique of the state action doctrine, deeply held ideas about the proper
role of judges in America have sustained the doctrine as a means of
preventing judges from acting outside areas of judicial competence.57
It is not disappearing anytime soon.  Thus, for court-centric academics
concerned with the private sphere, such as the workplace, equality
rhetoric seems like a convenient way to get past the problem of the
state action doctrine.  Judges can intervene in private arenas to pro-
tect certain kinds of equality because legislatures have passed antidis-
crimination laws telling them, roughly, how to do so.58
However, academics and activists should not let court-centrism
stand in the way of coherently theorizing the problem of freedom of
dress as a right.  Even though courts have stayed out of the “private”
arena, Congress and state legislatures are generally deemed institu-
tionally competent to act in that arena, and they do act.  Rights rheto-
ric as well as constitutionalism talk can be aimed at legislators and
voters, too.59  Academics exploring freedom of dress in the workplace
sometimes write of the problem as if there is no legal solution.60  But
it’s not the nature of law that’s necessarily the problem.  It’s the na-
ture of the specific type of law academics have been imagining.
56. Many have criticized the state action doctrine as incoherent in that it draws a line
between state action and inaction, as if background property and contract law as well as
wealth distribution were not sustained by state action. See, e.g., Gary Peller & Mark
Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 779 (2004) (discussing
Charles Black’s Foreword: “State Action,” Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967), and its proclamation that the state action doctrine was “a
conceptual disaster area” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  It is, on this argument,
almost entirely impossible for a state that enforces a criminal code to “not act.”  It either
allows or disallows self-help in the form of trespass and violence.
57. See Robin West, Response to State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 819,
829 (2004) (arguing that “[t]he constitutional status of welfare rights implicates the consti-
tutional obligation of legislatures, not courts, to act”).
58. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2000) (antidiscrimination
in employment); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (antidiscrimination in hous-
ing); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (antidiscrimination law for
individuals with disabilities).
59. See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text, describing the success of the Family R
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000), which secures a minimal statu-
tory right to employment leave in order to provide childcare or medical care to a family
member.  Yet the FMLA is seen by many as promoting substantive sex equality and, in fact,
was deemed legitimately passed under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 735, 740 (2003).
60. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. R
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D. A Rights-Rhetoric Approach to Equality Problems: The FMLA Model
The use of rights rhetoric to assist in tackling a problem that ap-
pears fundamentally to be one of equality is not new.  The Family
Medical Leave Act (FMLA)61 is an example of how granting all work-
ers certain substantive rights and better conditions can contribute to
equality.  The FMLA provides minimal rights to unpaid leave when
workers have their own medical problems, must care for family mem-
bers with medical problems, or must care for infants or newly placed
adopted or foster children.62  These rights are granted to both men
and women, but because women have historically borne the burden of
providing this sort of care, the law promotes the equality of women in
the workplace in two ways.
First, the FMLA counters the disparate impact that extremely
stingy leave policies or policies of no leave have on women who take
on greater shares of family care and, therefore, disproportionately
need the kind of leave that the FMLA provides.63  Second, the FMLA
removes some of the incentives for men and women to divide this
particular sort of domestic labor in the way they do in the first place.64
Before the FMLA, some employers would grant women unpaid leave
to care for a child, but would not grant the same unpaid leave to men.
While this was nominally a benefit for women, it operated to ensure
that women would continue to take that leave and, therefore, that wo-
men would continue to disproportionately need the leave.  The FMLA
breaks this cycle and encourages more men to take leave and contrib-
ute to family care, including childcare.65  The FMLA thus operates as
an antisubordination measure for women.  The Supreme Court has
even acknowledged, in a time when it was fairly accused of having an
61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654.
62. Id. § 2612.
63. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1977
(2003) (discussing the disproportionate impact that inadequate sex-neutral leave policies
have on women).
64. The legislative history of the FMLA expressly states:
As importantly, Federal policy is designed to afford all Americans equal em-
ployment opportunities based upon individual ability. While women have histori-
cally assumed primary responsibility for family caretaking, a policy that affords
women employment leave to provide family care while denying such leave to men
perpetuates gender-based employment discrimination and stereotyping and im-
properly impedes the ability of men to share greater responsibilities in providing
immediate physical and emotional care for their families.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 2, at 14 (1993).
65. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736–37 (2003) (explaining
how the FMLA combated gender-based stereotypes and reduced sex discrimination in hir-
ing and promoting by mandating equal leave for all eligible employees).
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“anti-antidiscrimination agenda,”66 that the FMLA was legitimately
passed under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy
women’s inequality and thus abrogates States’ Eleventh Amendment
immunity.67
Moreover, a FMLA-type approach helps resolve a deep debate
among feminist legal theorists over “equal-treatment/special-
treatment” at work.68  This debate, which centers on what to do about
pregnancy and motherhood in the workplace, struggled with issues
similar to the essentialism versus anti-essentialism debate currently
swirling around identity performative behaviors.  While equal treat-
ment would seem to disadvantage women, who bear the greater bur-
den of childcare, special treatment might legitimate and sustain that
very disparity in the sex-division of domestic labor.  The FMLA ap-
proach transcends this debate.  It is informed by the fact of unequal
sex-division of care work, but tackles the problem by providing sub-
stantive worker rights to at least some types of care provision, for
everyone.69
Similarly, the rights-based approach that I take provides a sub-
stantive right to some kinds of identity performance—the freedom of
dress—but provides that right to everyone.  To be clear, my argument
for a rights-based approach is not meant to preclude the extension of
antidiscrimination laws like Title VII to cover exercises of the freedom
of dress.70  If, instead of being codified as a separate statute, the FMLA
had been passed as an amendment to Title VII, or if federal judges
had interpreted Title VII to require something like the FMLA ap-
proach, I still would approve of the policy.  Similarly here, I do not
wish to engage in debates over judicial activism, statutory and constitu-
tional methods of interpretation, or in what part of the United States
66. Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142 (2002)
(emphasis omitted).
67. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 727, 735.
68. See LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB: MATERNITY POLICY IN THE U.S. WORKPLACE
100–13, 128–61 (1993) (discussing the equal-treatment/special-treatment debate).
69. Id. at 156–61.
70. In fact, I have separately argued, in the context of a particular case, that a makeup
regulation should be held to violate Title VII. See Carbado et al., The Jespersen Story, supra
note 6 (examining Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)).  In R
some sense, this case ought to be particularly easy in the universe of possible Title VII
challenges to appearance regulation because the makeup regulation at issue is explicitly
sex-based.  But it has not been easy for the courts, given doctrinal carve-outs to Title VII for
grooming codes. Id. at 138.  If dress were given the status of a fundamental right, this case
would have been easy for courts using the “sex-plus” doctrine, which prohibits discrimina-
tion based on sex plus an immutable trait or exercise of a fundamental right. See Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam) (refusing to permit “one
hiring policy for women and another for men—each having pre-school-age children”).
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Code the freedom of dress belongs—although these debates are
clearly necessary.  Rather, I wish to first, and more broadly, promote
the rights-based approach to freedom of dress.
III. THE FREEDOM OF DRESS
Many have felt that regulation of choices concerning freedom of
dress is antithetical to freedom, liberty, or progress.71  Why?  The few
times that federal courts have sought to answer the question, even
where they have found a right or liberty interest in self-presentation,
they have often chosen not to explore the factors that might support
that right.72  To the extent they have, the argument has gone some-
thing like, “Making everyone dress the same is something they do in
other, uncivilized and unfree places.  Therefore, we can’t regulate
hair length.”73  The lengthiest treatment by any court of which I am
aware is one by the Supreme Court of Alaska,74 but even this treat-
ment is not extremely deep.  It’s no wonder that courts are all over the
map when it comes to balancing the right against other interests or
rights75—they haven’t tried to explore why it is important and there-
fore don’t have a principled basis for balancing it against other
interests.
We have seen an argument that freedom of dress should be pro-
tected by formal equality-based antidiscrimination law because it is a
type of identity performance, indistinguishable from protected identi-
ties like race or gender.  I have rejected the argument that this is the
71. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 73, 74, 82, 148, and 149. R
72. E.g., Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).  The Breen court stated that
[t]he right to wear one’s hair at any length or in any desired manner is an
ingredient of personal freedom protected by the United States Constitution.
Whether this right is designated as within the “penumbras” of the first amend-
ment freedom of speech, or as encompassed within the ninth amendment as an
additional fundamental right[ ] . . . which exist[s] alongside those fundamental
rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments, it
clearly exists and is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 1036 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Hodge v. Lynd, 88 F. Supp.
2d 1234, 1238–39 (D.N.M. 2000) (holding, without further explanation, that “there is a
liberty interest in one’s choice of clothing, grooming, and other aspects of personal ap-
pearance[ ] under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution”).
73. See, e.g., Olff v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1042–44 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (describing practices in Asian institutions
and in ancient Sparta); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 & n.10 (1st Cir. 1970)
(referencing “Peter the Great’s proscription of beards”).
74. See Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972), discussed supra at note 20. R
75. See varying results in school cases, public employment cases, and public nudity
cases cited infra Parts III.D, V.B, VI.
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appropriate legal construct within which to protect the freedom of
dress.  Perhaps just as important, however, I want to reject the idea
that equality should occupy our thinking about this subject.  Scholarly
obsession with expanding antidiscrimination law to cover non-
immutable traits has been accompanied by a scholarly neglect of what
is perhaps an even more difficult problem: deciding which activities
we should value with special legal protections, and providing norma-
tive arguments for why.76
A. Identity: What Is It, and What Is It Good (and Bad) For?
Cultural norms are imposed through law, the coercion of medical
and psychological establishments, the coercion of subcultural groups
such as religious organizations or social groups, the coercion of corpo-
rations engaged in advertising, and all kinds of informal micro-level
social coercion.77  These cultural norms affect our lives by influencing
our choices, beliefs, and even desires and aversions, such that even
when we are formally free to make choices, a myriad of factors deter-
mine and limit those choices.  Even with the law’s help, we could not
exist “free” of these manifold forms of coercion, nor would we neces-
sarily want to.  However, while norms will always exist, it is important
that those norms be capable of changing and, to that end, that indi-
viduals be empowered to challenge and contribute to the construc-
tion of those norms.  As Jack Balkin has argued, certain kinds of
nonpolitical speech must therefore be protected as crucial to partici-
pation in a democratic culture.78  A democratic culture, in which eve-
76. Quite a few years ago, Richard Ford called on scholars to make rights-based, rather
than equality-based, arguments for the protection of grooming choices from unjust regula-
tion. See Ford, supra note 46, at 1813 (arguing that advocates of cultural rights must specifi- R
cally identify traits that merit protecting).  More recently, Kenji Yoshino has also moved
away from an equality argument for protecting these behaviors. See generally Yoshino, supra
note 6.  Instead, he now more strongly promotes a “reason-forcing conversation” grounded R
in a respect for liberty. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
RIGHTS 186–91 (2006).  But, as Paul Horwitz has described it, even this latter work still
seems to be “a conversation about that [reason-forcing] conversation.”  Paul Horwitz, Un-
covering Identity, 105 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
A rare example of a rights-based argument for protecting grooming and dress choices
appears in Catherine L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appear-
ance Regulation as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111 (2006).  Fisk only considers the
workplace context and proposes thinking of dress and grooming choices in terms of the
legal concept of worker privacy. Id. at 1125–31.  But the political and public nature of
dress choices, which depend on the gaze of others to gain their full import, makes the
concept of privacy dissatisfying as a normative basis for protecting dress choices.
77. For a seminal work on this point, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
78. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expres-
sion for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1–6 (2004) (arguing for a theory of
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ryone has the right to participate in making cultural meaning, is just
as important in his view as is a democratic political system.79  Balkin
has therefore argued that we must, in addition to protecting the right
of individuals to engage in political speech, protect their right to en-
gage in cultural meaning making.80
I add to this the crucial point that a precursor to cultural and
political meaning making both is identity, which we can define as the
particular values, beliefs, and aspects of our selves that we deem so
important we consider them self-defining.  Our aversions, desires, be-
liefs, and choices all make up our identity, but our identity in turn
then affects our aversions, desires, beliefs, and choices.  Even when an
aspect of identity seems “unchosen,” such as a biological sex or an
ethnicity, we still choose, albeit sometimes within very strong and
other times within very weak constraints, whether that “immutable”
trait will be part of our identity.81  The goal of a dynamic, changeable
society—one in which people can change and challenge norms—is
promoted by law that protects the formation and reformation of iden-
tity, law that carves out some space for the exercise of agency in the
construction of identity.82  Without this space, identity becomes self-
defining not in the good sense of a set of values and practices that one
holds dear (but nevertheless could be different), but self-defining in
the bad sense of a set of stereotypes about a group that are resistant to
change.
For instance, identifying oneself as a “mother” signals some set of
values, beliefs, and desires that the person who calls herself a
“mother” deems relevant to the context at hand.  It is incredibly con-
tested what set of values, beliefs, and desires “mother” should signify,
freedom of speech that takes into account the cultural and participatory features of free-
dom of expression).
79. Id. at 3–4.
80. Id. at 37–42.
81. For a similar conception of identity as choice, rather than a “discovered” fact, see
AMARTYA SEN, THE ARGUMENTATIVE INDIAN 350–52 (2005).
82. “[A] high tolerance of diversity of dress expression is a measure of our practical
commitment to a democratic, open society, to which Mill’s advocacy of the ‘no harm’ crite-
rion was so elegantly tailored.”  William J.F. Keenan, Dress Freedom: The Personal and the
Political, in DRESSED TO IMPRESS 179, 180 (William J.F. Keenan ed., 2001) (citation omitted);
cf. Judith Butler, “Appearances Aside,” 88 CAL. L. REV. 55 (2000), reprinted in PREJUDICIAL
APPEARANCES 73 (2001).
For this challenge to take place, it must be possible for a person whose ap-
pearance calls the category of the person into question to enter into the field of
appearance precisely as a person.  This is the power the astereotypical has to re-
write the stereotype, . . . a power that is “had” to the extent that such a person is
not first defeated by the powers of discrimination.
Id. at 83.
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but nevertheless, “mother” is a signal.  It is a good thing for persons to
be able to define and demonstrate the deep importance of certain
values via the device of an identity, such as mother, but it is a bad
thing when the meaning of “mother” is so fixed that all women with
children are pressured to have the same deeply held values.  At one
time they were, for instance, by employers who forced all pregnant
women to quit work.83  Fortunately, people in the modern world have
a bit more space to contest what it means to be a “mother.”  But the
space for that contestation has required freedom.  Protecting the free-
dom of workers to become pregnant and have children—via bans on
pregnancy discrimination and gender-neutral entitlements to child-
care leave—is part of what provides more space for that contestation
of what it means to be a mother.
Many behaviors are a part of identity formation and reformation.
Law cannot protect the freedom to engage in all such behaviors; an
attempt to do so would collapse into an attempt to transcend all
norms and all coercion—a foolish task.  However, there are more rea-
sons to care about dress, reasons that make it unique among other
types of speech, art, or identity performance.  In this Part, I further
explore the importance of dress in order to support my claim that we
should have a freedom of dress.
B. Dress as an Exercise of Control over the Body
The body is the innermost part of the material Self in each
of us; and certain parts of the body seem more intimately
ours than the rest.  The clothes come next.  The old saying
that the human person is composed of three parts—soul,
body and clothes—is more than a joke.  We so appropriate
our clothes and identify ourselves with them that there are
few of us who, if asked to choose between having a beautiful
body clad in raiment perpetually shabby and unclean, and
having an ugly and blemished form always spotlessly attired,
would not hesitate a moment before making a decisive
reply.84
The Supreme Court, as well as many commentators, has recog-
nized a fundamental right to bodily integrity in the Due Process
83. See, e.g., Berg v. Richmond Unified Sch. Dist., 528 F.2d 1208, 1209–10 & n.1 (9th
Cir. 1975) (describing policy requiring women to take unpaid maternity leave starting in
the seventh month of pregnancy); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-8, pt. 2, at 9–10 (1993)
(prohibiting employers from interfering with an employee’s right to take medical or family
leave).
84. 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 292 (1890).
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Clause.85  Additionally, many courts and commentators have discussed
a right to bodily privacy.86  Bodily integrity is generally understood as
a right to be free from unwanted touching, to make one’s own choices
about medical treatment, and to control, in general, one’s own
body.87  Bodily privacy is generally understood to be a right to cover
up certain areas of one’s body considered to be especially private,
such as the genitals.88  Unfortunately, in some contexts courts have
made this right to privacy explicitly dependent upon the gender of
the person to whom the body is exposed.89  I place no stock in this
sort of explicitly sex-dependent right of privacy.  Of course, even when
not made explicitly sex-based, a right to genital or other bodily privacy
in the sense of a right to cover oneself may be implicitly sex-based and
problematic.90  However, we cannot deny that in the current social
context, some right of privacy is implicated when one loses personal
control over whether one’s own body is exposed.  We cannot be
forced to uncover or, I argue, cover ourselves against our will.
One reason self-presentation is important to individuals is that it
involves the public presentation of the physical body.  Piercings, tat-
toos, hair cutting, hair growing, and hair coloring involve the right to
modify and manipulate one’s own body as an exercise of the right to
bodily integrity.  Jewelry, clothing, and makeup all touch the body so
closely that they also involve the right to bodily integrity, a concept
with roots as deep as the common law protections against battery,
which recognize that one must control not only the interior, but also
the surface of one’s own body against the actions of private entities.91
Finally, clothing choices can enact the right to bodily privacy, as some-
times individuals are required to expose more of their body than they
85. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)) (recognizing the right to bodily integrity); Vacco v. Quill, 521
U.S. 793, 807 (1997) (clarifying that the right to refuse medical treatment rests in the right
“to bodily integrity and freedom from unwanted touching”).
86. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1259–60, 1269 (2003) (discussing the possible existence of a right
to be free from exposure of the body and criticizing judicial constructions of this concept
that divorce it from consent and marry it to sex).
87. See cases cited supra note 85. R
88. See Kapczynski, supra note 86, at 1276 (discussing limited recognition of privacy R
interests “in anything other than genital physicality”).
89. See id. at 1269 (contending that courts incorrectly consider a viewer’s sex in deter-
mining whether the right to privacy of bodily exposure has been infringed).
90. Id. at 1269–70.
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 16, 18, 19 (1965) (defining battery as
causing an offensive or harmful contact with the person of another, or an apprehension of
such a contact, defining the requisite level of intent, and defining offensive contact as that
which “offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity”).
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wish.  For example, Nikki Youngblood, a high school student in Flor-
ida who preferred to wear boys’ clothing, was required to wear a
“drape” for her high school yearbook photo, rather than the shirt and
tie that boys were permitted to wear.92  She objected to this require-
ment partially because the drape exposed her neck, shoulders, and
upper chest, something she was not used to as a girl who had worn
boys’ clothing since the age of eight.93
Of course, many of our choices can be articulated in terms of the
right to control one’s own body.  For instance, I could articulate my
“right to speak” in terms of “my right to move my lips and control the
passage of air in and out of my lungs.”  But these are not terms in
which the activity of speaking are frequently experienced.  On the
other hand, we have all experienced self-presentation choices in terms
of how we feel about our bodies.  As Paul Sweetman explains:
When I wear a suit, I walk, feel, and act differently, and not
simply because of the garment’s cultural connotations, . . .
but also because of the way the suit is cut, and the way its
sheer materiality both enables and constrains, encouraging
or demanding a certain gait, posture and demeanour, whilst
simultaneously denying me the full range of bodily move-
ment that would be available were I dressed in jogging-pants
and a loose-fitting t-shirt.94
Feminists have long fought for freedom from ultra-feminine forms of
self-presentation not merely in terms of sexual politics, but also in
terms of the right to control one’s own body:95 These clothes, hair-
styles, and the like weren’t bad merely because their cultural meaning
operated to subordinate women, but also because they physically re-
strained women.
92. GenderPAC, National Conference on Gender, http://www.gpac.org/youth/
news.html?cmd=view&msgnum=0408 (interview of Nikki Youngblood, July 1, 2002).
93. Id.
94. Paul Sweetman, Shop-Window Dummies? Fashion, the Body, and Emergent Socialities, in
BODY DRESSING 59, 66 (Joanne Entwistle & Elizabeth Wilson eds., 2001).  Sweetman
continues:
And this is—crucially—far from simply a matter of my own individual experience
of the body: it is socially significant in a number of ways. . . .
We can talk, then, of fashion and adornment as “techniques of the body”
which impact not only on our appearance, but also on our experience of the body
and the ways in which the body can be used. . . .
. . . Bodies and selves are made and remade in part through the ways in
which they are adorned, and this is a process that involves “carnal knowing” as
well as “cognitive apprehension.”
Id. at 66–67 (citations omitted).
95. E.g., GILMAN, supra note 12, at 116–17, 133–41 (discussing the oppressive nature of R
fashion).
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Moreover, how we experience our body is relevant to our experi-
ence of the entire world.  We have “embodied subjectivities.”96  This is
why Elaine Scarry has argued that torturers actually “unmake the
world” of the victim through the infliction of physical pain.97  As Jo-
anne Entwistle has explained, “our experience of the body is not as
inert object but the envelope of our being, the site for our articulation
of self. . . .  [A]nd what could be more visible an aspect of the body
than dress? . . .  [D]ress constitutes part of the experience of the body
and identity.”98  Many other writers have eloquently described this as-
pect of dress—its close relation to and inseparability in some instances
from the body—as relevant to the meaning and experience of cloth-
ing and cosmetics.  For instance, Eco describes how wearing tight
jeans so constrains him and forces his physical behaviors that it affects
his writing.99  He thinks of clothing as operating like a semiotic code,
structuring our perception of the world.100  Colette, in The Vagabond,
describes the effect of makeup resting directly on the face—how it
feels like a plaster that alters not only one’s outward image, but also
one’s sense of self:
Me.  As that word came into my head, I involuntarily
looked in the mirror.  There’s no getting away from it, it re-
ally is me there behind that mask of purplish rouge, my eyes
ringed with a halo of blue grease-paint beginning to melt.
Can the rest of my face be going to melt also?  What if noth-
ing were to remain from my whole reflection but a streak of
dyed colour stuck to the glass like a long, muddy tear?101
This connection between freedom of dress and a notion that con-
trol over our own bodies is essential to human dignity is part of why it
strikes many of us as intrusive and unwarranted when someone tells us
what to wear, how to cut our hair, or whether we can have a tattoo.  It
is as if the body is being taken over.  And without a large measure of
control over our own bodies, it is difficult to experience the world as a
free person.  Eco began to understand this when, after becoming
aware of the effects of restrictive clothing on his own relationship to
the world, he realized that “[w]oman has been enslaved by fashion
96. See generally MARGARET A. MCLAREN, FEMINISM, FOUCAULT, AND EMBODIED SUBJECTIV-
ITY (2002).
97. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD
37–38 (1985).
98. Joanne Entwistle, The Dressed Body, in BODY DRESSING, supra note 94, at 33, 46. R
99. ECO, supra note 14, at 191–95. R
100. Id. at 194–95.
101. COLETTE, THE VAGABOND 7 (Enid McLeod trans., Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2001)
(1910).
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not only because . . . it made her a sex object; she has been enslaved
chiefly because the clothing counseled for her forced her psychologi-
cally to live for the exterior.”102  When prisoners at Auschwitz were
tattooed, they were not merely registered as prisoners; they were
dehumanized.
Regardless of the private or public nature of the context we are
in, certain rights to bodily integrity and privacy are generally pro-
tected by state criminal law103 and the common-law torts of battery104
and assault.105 The sense that other persons should not, except in un-
usual circumstances, intrude on what we do with our own bodies is
quite strong, even in the private context.  Thus, when others control
our self-presentation, this is intrusive in a unique manner, different
from what we feel when our other actions are controlled.  Because
personal appearance choices involve manipulating the appearance of
the physical self, they can be afforded special status: They are not just
politically and culturally significant decisions; they are experienced as
highly personal ones, too.
Why, then, do I not articulate borders of the freedom of dress
that map more clearly onto traditional medical or biological under-
standings of the borders of the body?  Why do I not argue for the
protection of choices with respect to hairstyle and tattooing, and ig-
nore protection of choices with respect to clothing and makeup?  De-
ciding whether to cut one’s own hair is, under a very traditional
understanding of the body, quite different from deciding whether to
wear a dress.106
I do not draw the borders of the freedom of dress so as to map
directly onto the borders of the human body because I am not pro-
moting a naturalized and essentialized conception of the human body
and its separation from the external world.  I am not claiming that
freedom of dress is important because the body is sacred, natural, or
immutable.  Indeed, I am positing that the body is not sacred, is
deeply alterable, and that “natural” and “unalterable” attributes of our
bodies—such as the color of our skin, the shape of our genitals, the
color of our eyes, and the texture of our hairs—may be no more im-
portant to many of us than “artificial” and “alterable” aspects of our
102. ECO, supra note 14, at 194. R
103. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1980) (consolidating battery, mayhem, and assault
into a single crime).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965) (defining battery).
105. Id. § 21 (defining assault).
106. Similarly, why do I not include within the right choices concerning smell, such as
choice of perfume, rather than only including choices affecting appearance?
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bodies, such as our tattoos, piercings, jewelry, clothing, dyed hair,
braided hair, straightened hair, or shaved heads.
In fact, the distinction between the natural or immutable and the
artificial or choice-based aspects of our bodies is a slippery one.  Skin
color, genital shape, eye color, and hair texture are all alterable, with
varying levels of effort.  Body weight is alterable, but sometimes only
with great effort and social support.  Tattoos are close to unremov-
able.  Hip implants are removable, but only at great medical cost to
those who have them, and once implanted, they are internal to the
owner.  Are scars from accidents “natural,” or “artificial”?  What about
scars that are deliberately obtained as a form of cosmetic body modifi-
cation?  Scars that result from surgery?  Does it matter if the surgery
was defined as “elective” or “medically necessary,” and whose defini-
tion for those categories should we use?
Rather than treating the body as a temple, I am recognizing its
inescapable, however historically, culturally, or politically contingent,
role in our experience of self.  Much theory attempts to de-naturalize
the concept of identity by pointing to its social construction, but nev-
ertheless tries to develop a politics which will not deny its historical
and social importance to human life.107  Thus, Butler promotes “gen-
der trouble” as a subversive politics which avoids the essentializing and
totalizing problems of identity politics.108  One of her examples of
such trouble is drag performance, which neither seeks to transcend
gender nor essentializes it.109  Rather, it subverts the naturalization of
gender by highlighting its performativity.110  Similarly, in Simians,
Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, Donna Haraway pro-
motes “cyborg politics” as an alternative to identity politics.111  Her
cyborg metaphor is an attempt to disrupt the naturalization of the
human body and of gender,112 but without seeking to be “innocent”
or transcendent113 of the systems of power and coercion that socially
construct gender and the body.114
I recognize that the body may hold no more inherent, acontex-
tual value than chattel such as clothes, jewelry, computers, or iPods.
Thus, I do not seek to construct a right that privileges outdated con-
107. E.g., BUTLER, supra note 48, at 44, 95–100, 119. R
108. Id. at 44.
109. Id. at 174–80.
110. Butler, supra note 38. R
111. DONNA J. HARAWAY, SIMIANS, CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE
150 (1991).
112. Id. at 149–51.
113. Id. at 151, 180.
114. Id. at 180–81.
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structions of a biological or “natural” body.  The body’s manipulation
and alteration has become widespread.  The body and the world
around it have begun to bleed into each other: Extreme body modifi-
cation is on a more visible rise, clothes and other objects seem more
and more like parts of our bodies and extensions of ourselves,
transsexual persons’ alterations of their gender are more and more
visible, some Asian Americans have opted for eyelid surgery,115 and
Michael Jackson is widely thought to have changed his skin color.
And yet, all these trends don’t seem to represent a transcendence of the
body as having any importance at all.  These are not even trends to-
ward the soul and mind taking precedence over the body.  If transsex-
ual identity were about transcending the importance of genital
shapes, then why would so many transsexuals endure the oppression
they endure, spend the money they spend, and enter into compli-
cated relationships with the medical establishment to change that
which doesn’t matter—the shape of one’s genitals?
Rather, these manipulations, alterations, adornments, and exten-
sions of our bodies themselves carry a great deal of meaning to most
of the people engaged in them.  We are not “liberated” from a “re-
pressive” notion of the body’s importance, and we have not tran-
scended it.  However, we have extended our understanding of the self.
We are selves constituted no longer simply by soul and body, but by
soul, body, clothes, tattoos, piercings, and the like.  Thus, the appro-
priate borders for the freedom of dress are not the exact borders of
the body, but nor are they limitless or willfully ignorant of the body.
My choice of clothing, hairstyle, tattoos, piercings, and makeup as the
manipulations of the self that constitute a freedom of dress reflects
social realities, realities I explore further in the next Section.116  After
all, there’s more to the self, and the role of dress in exercising agency
over it, than the physical self.
115. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Ethnic Ideals: Rethinking Plastic Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
1991, at C1 (reporting that “[t]he creation of [an eyelid] fold is the most commonly re-
quested cosmetic operation among Asian-Americans”).
116. Of course, one might take account of the body more than I do, and the commonal-
ity of appearance manipulation as a site of self-definition less.  This might lead to, for
instance, including choices about the way one smells, such as perfume-wearing, within the
freedom of dress.  To analogize once again to the FMLA, the decision to protect those who
miss work to care for sick family, and not sick friends, sick neighbors, or sick strangers, is at
some level an arbitrary one.  But I would not call this arbitrariness unprincipled.  The
choice is informed by the well-recognized pervasiveness of appearance manipulation in the
psychological development and exploration of identity, especially for children.
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C. The Developmental Role of Dress
Individuals are not born with an entirely formed sense of identity
and personality.  Rather, a sense of both individual self and connec-
tion to others is formed over time.  Freedom of dress serves the need
of our culture to provide a setting in which the individual can form
her personality.117  Thus, “[t]he discovery of identity is a crucial phase
of the interaction of culture and the personality.”118  Children begin
to have a visible interest in clothing around the age of two, one that is
deeply influenced by parents “who confer their ideas of masculinity
and femininity on young children,” and therefore encourage girls to
develop a stronger and more detailed interest.119  Between the ages of
five and nine, however, “the child becomes more of an independent
consumer.”120  Once children become teenagers, they tend to become
extremely concerned with fashion and other forms of self-
presentation.121  Although “adolescent subculture” is deeply affected
by the industrialist and capitalist society in which it forms,122 the fact is
that adolescent subcultures do exist, and are important to children’s
development of a sense of both self and group identity.
Many used to understand fashion as detrimental to self-
development, but no longer.123  The therapeutic role of forms of self-
presentation, and the fact that clothes can recall memories of good
luck, are now acknowledged.124  Moreover, the freedom to choose in-
dividual fashion can greatly improve self-esteem and provide a sense
of power over the environment.125
Fashion is functional in the search for meaning and to establish
identity.126  “People strive to discover who they really are, and to ex-
press their real selves in various ways, including the expression of self
through the selection of fashion.”127  In the past, personal appearance
manipulation served to maintain class status and, therefore, tended to
operate as a restriction on individuality.  Sumptuary laws criminalized
117. ANSPACH, supra note 5, at 23. R
118. Id.
119. Id. at 290.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 291–93.
122. Id. at 292.
123. JEANETTE C. LAUER & ROBERT H. LAUER, FASHION POWER 222–23 (1981).
124. See, e.g., Tina Gaudoin, Makeup, HARPER’S BAZAAR, Sept. 1992, at 324, 326 (describ-
ing the Look Good . . . Feel Better program, which is said to have helped many women
struggling with cancer survival).
125. LAUER & LAUER, supra note 123, at 228–29. R
126. Id. at 3.
127. Id.
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the practice of wearing attire inappropriate to one’s social and eco-
nomic class.128  But now, the use of fashion to maintain class status has
been greatly diminished.  What is “in fashion” changes rapidly and
often appropriates the practices of traditionally subordinated groups,
such as people of color or the poor.129  Moreover, fashion is far less
rigid than it once was in the past.  In this postmodern130 world, almost
anything can be in fashion.  Nineteenth-century writers imagined that
“consumers either would not or could not rebel against fashion
trends.”131  But in the twenty-first century, we understand that fashion
can be reformed in a grassroots manner, even while its workings
“elude human reason.”132  For instance, women rebelled against the
corset and succeeded in causing it to go out of fashion.133  Since that
time, American women have frequently protested various new fash-
ions and even signed pledges not to wear them, no matter what any-
one else does.134  While these protests sometimes succeed and
sometimes do not, “[f]ashion is obviously not the coercive social fact
that it seemed to be in the nineteenth century.”135
Thus, on the one hand, “the function of fashion has shifted from
class maintenance by status symbols to identity seeking by ego sym-
bols,” and clothes now have a deep linkage to the ego.136  Clothes, and
other aspects of personal appearance, help us negotiate the need to
conform to the group and the need to express ourselves as individu-
als.137  They also function “to stress the point that [one is] not com-
mitted wholly to one particular identity.”138  On the other hand,
personal appearance serves to signify and enact our commitment to
and membership in various subcultures.  In fact, the way we present
ourselves can so affect us psychologically that educators confirm that
girls in high school “act up” more when they wear pants than when
128. See ANSPACH, supra note 5, at 261 (discussing Massachusetts’s sumptuary laws); R
LAUER & LAUER, supra note 123, at 56–57 (noting that sumptuary laws regulate status dis- R
tinctions in some societies).
129. For example, there are grunge, deconstructed, boho, hip hop, and “working class
hipster” fashions.
130. I use postmodern here in the sense of fragmented, diverse, and self-contradictory.
131. LAUER & LAUER, supra note 123, at 144. R
132. Id.
133. Id. at 144–45.  Clothing that references the corset has, of course, now come back
into fashion.  However, this does not negate the progress of the feminist reformation of
fashion, given that corsets are no longer considered required attire.
134. Id. at 148–49.
135. Id. at 150.
136. Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id. at 4.
138. Id.
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they are dressed femininely,139 and that students in general “act up”
less when they wear uniforms.  Tattoos and piercings also, in their per-
manence, can have a profoundly emotional effect.  After September
11th, many people in New York obtained tattoos commemorating the
events.140  These tattoos functioned as part of the grieving and recov-
ery process, but will serve as reminders of the tragedy for years to
come.
Given that our choices about how we manipulate our appearance
have become so psychologically affecting, it’s no wonder that feminists
placed emphasis on being able to choose and reform women’s clothes
at a time when they did not even have the right to vote,141 and that
feminist activists continued to be concerned with the meaning of wo-
men’s dress in 1968, when they threw bras in a trash can to enhance
their claims to equality and freedom.142  If we can’t control the way we
look, our self-esteem, personality, and social identity are all affected.
D. Dress in Postmodern Life: The Personal is Political
Freedom of dress is not important simply because it is indistin-
guishable from race, gender, or other important identity categories.
To think of it only as such is too essentialist, while to think of it only as
a means of exercising control over one’s own body, ignoring its psy-
chological, cultural, and political role would be too materialist.  Free-
dom of dress is important because manipulation of personal
appearance is for many of us the means by which we negotiate the
personal and the political—a means constituted on the borders of our
own bodies.143  As such, it is the place where we form and reform an
identity that is both individual and part of a community or subculture.
This identity is not simply a communication to others of how we feel.
Identity is something which, like religion, is unstable and mutable, yet
it structures and colors our entire experience of the world.  How we
define our difference from and similarity to others and what we think
139. ANSPACH, supra note 5, at 329. R
140. Tara Godvin, Tattoos Memorialize Sept. 11, Lost Loved Ones, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 9,
2002, at C3; Julie Salamon, Tragedy Pierces the Heart, Memory the Skin, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4,
2003, at E35.
141. See ANSPACH, supra note 5, at 330 (recounting the nineteenth-century Bloomerism R
movement).
142. ALICE ECHOLS, DARING TO BE BAD: RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967–1975, at 93
(1989).  This event, at a Miss America pageant, was erroneously reported by the media as a
“bra-burning” event, (although perhaps with egging on by feminist organizers themselves
to gain publicity), and the term “bra-burning feminist” has remained in our parlance ever
since. Id. at 94.
143. See Entwistle, supra note 98, at 33, 37 (“Dress lies at the margins of the body and R
marks the boundary between self and other, individual and society.”).
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to be the significance of our corporeal bodies all define our existence
as deeply as, if not more than, for some, our spiritual beliefs do.
Even when we are young in years, dress is a primary site of experi-
mentation with, and formation of, our identities and our sense of be-
longing or the clarity of our convictions.  Choice in dress is crucial in
developing what often seems like a self-contradictory term, a “public
self,” because the medium of dress is uniquely suited to this task.
Dress is a particularly schizophrenic form of expression,144 in that
each instance of self-presentation highlights a tension between our ex-
istences as individuals who act, desire, and believe on the one hand,
and as members of a socio-political-cultural system that determines
our actions, desires, and beliefs on the other hand.  When we sign in
the medium of dress, we call attention to the individual, corporeal
body, insisting on the fact of an individual self with an identity sepa-
rate from the socio-political-cultural context in which it exists.145  And
yet, the symbology of dress depends entirely on the individual identify-
ing herself as a conformist to and consumer of various group and class
norms, as an antagonist of those norms, as an affiliate of various ideas
and philosophies.  Dress symbology involves covering, modifying, and
otherwise denying the corporeal body in order to transform it into
just another sign within the crude system of meanings that is fashion.
“As Eugenie Lemoine-Luccioni suggests, clothing draws the body so
that it can be culturally seen, and articulates it as a meaningful
form.”146  That the body requires the work of dress to transform it into
a culturally visible, meaningful form calls attention to the dependence
of individual status on the group and social power.  Even if we were to
describe self-presentation as art, no other kind of art does precisely
this.
Rather than simply protecting this freedom of dress under First
Amendment and equality rubrics, I propose treating it as a unique
fundamental right.  More than just a “hybrid” right,147 it is a unique
assertion of human agency in the context of cultural coercion.  Dress
also serves a unique psychological and developmental function, help-
ing the individual, especially the adolescent, negotiate the borders be-
tween personal beliefs and desires, individualism and conformity.  In
144. I thank Clint Thacker for helping me articulate this point.
145. As Jacqueline Lo writes in Beyond Happy Hybridity: Performing Asian-Australian Identi-
ties, in ALTER/ASIANS 152 (Ien Ang et al. eds., 2000): “The materiality of the body
problematises the notion of identity formation as the endless free play of fluid, fragmented
selves. . . .  [I]dentities are grounded in specific bodies, histories and geographies.” Id. at
160.
146. Wilson & de la Haye, supra note 2, at 2. R
147. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990).
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short, it helps the individual develop, revise, destabilize, and stabilize
the identities that shape his or her entire experience of the world.
A large number of federal cases were brought in the 1960s and
1970s challenging hair length and beard regulations for students and
teachers in public schools.148  Judges on both sides of these cases felt
it necessary to comment on their silliness and frivolity, and expressed
personal irritation with having to decide the cases in a time of growing
federal caseload.  Some judges commented on the silliness of the pub-
lic, who wrongly imagined that in these hair and beard variations lay
“the seeds of violence and revolution.”149  These judges hoped the
public would “come to its senses” and stop regulating hair length and
beards.  Other judges commented on the frivolity of the claims being
brought by the plaintiffs, and seemed irritated that the plaintiffs
would even deign to think they could go to the federal courts to pro-
tect something as unimportant as their hairstyle or facial hair.150
All these judges were wrong to comment on the “silliness” of the
issue.  The fact that so many public bodies sought to regulate haircuts
and facial hair, and that so many people subject to those regulations
felt injured enough to bring lawsuits, all within the space of a few
years, indicates that something must have been at stake.  The fight
over haircuts and facial hair was not a fight over a specific and well-
defined set of political values, but it was a fight over cultural values—a
fight over a general attitude and approach to much of life itself, in-
cluding consumer life.  This is a fact that, ironically, is sometimes used
against plaintiffs, as if expressing a general social attitude were less
important than expressing a specific political belief.151  But if any-
thing, the fact that the fight was a “culture war” probably made it
more important, not less important, to parties on both sides. Thus,
there simply cannot be any doubt that personal appearance regula-
148. See Recent Case, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1702, 1702–04 & n.4 (1971) (listing hair and
grooming cases).
149. E.g., Hander v. San Jacinto Junior Coll., 519 F.2d 273, 281–82 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Brown, C.J., concurring).
150. See, e.g., Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 52 (7th Cir. 1974) (Pell, J., concurring)
(stating that the “high school-hair issue . . . [lacks] sufficient constitutional significance”).
151. E.g., Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that
appellant’s “broad statement of cultural values” communicated through dress was not suffi-
ciently particularized to be protected); E. Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 562 F.2d
838, 858 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (holding that schoolteacher’s claim that refusing to wear
a tie “communicates a comprehensive view of life and society” meant that it was afforded
less protection than pure speech would be afforded); Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281,
1283 (1st Cir. 1970) (recognizing that there “may be an element of expression and speech
involved in one’s choice of hair length and style, if only the expression of disdain for
conventionality.  However, we reject the notion that plaintiff’s hair length is of a suffi-
ciently communicative character to warrant the full protection of the First Amendment”).
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tion and freedoms are important.  The question is where cultural bat-
tles like the one that long hair on men embodied in the 1970s can be
played out, and what forces can be marshaled in the fight.  That ques-
tion is still relevant today, as numerous litigants and scholars interro-
gate restrictions on their dress, behavior, and other aspects of identity
performance in the workplace as potentially violative of antidis-
crimination law.
E. Dress as Communication
One theory of why dress is important is that it is a kind of speech.
Under this theory, we can address claims concerning freedom of dress
by simply assessing whether the dress communicates a sufficiently
“particularized” message, understandable by observers, to count as
speech in a given instance, using well-established First Amendment
doctrine for the protection of expressive acts as opposed to “pure
speech.”152  Speech has, of course, been theorized endlessly, so if
dress were really important only because it is often a type of nonverbal
speech, then this would explain and justify the failure to theorize
dress as a unique right.
Indeed, some litigants have been able to characterize their
choices about dress as equivalent to political speech and, as a result,
have prevailed in challenging unwarranted state regulation of their
choices.153  When litigants’ exercise of the freedom of dress has not
been so easily understood as political speech, they have not fared as
well.154  But this alone is unremarkable, given that First Amendment
doctrine privileges political speech over commercial and other kinds
of speech.155  This privileged status afforded political speech is
152. Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (protecting flag burning as
speech), with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–08 (1969)
(distinguishing regulation of skirt length and hairstyle from prohibition of the black arm-
band at issue in the case, which the court viewed as pure speech).
153. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–26 (1971) (protecting as speech the wear-
ing of a jacket that said “Fuck the Draft”); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508–09 (finding that wearing
a black armband to protest the Vietnam War constituted pure speech); cf. Johnson, 491 U.S.
at 404, 420 (viewing flag burning as speech).
154. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (upholding the regula-
tion of a nude dancing establishment based on the “secondary effects” of adult entertain-
ment businesses); S. Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding that nude sunbathing was not protected expression under the First
Amendment).
155. E.g., Pap’s A. M., 529 U.S. at 289, 294 (2000) (“[E]ven though we recognize that the
First Amendment will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expres-
sion is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled politi-
cal debate . . . .” (quoting Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976)));
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deemed legitimate by many, as it is the most closely related to demo-
cratic functioning,156 and illegitimate by others.157  But these are de-
bates about the proper way to match up First Amendment doctrine
with theories of the importance and nature of free speech and art.
They are not problems specific to the freedom of dress.
The theory that freedom of dress is just the same as freedom of
speech is not, on its face, implausible.  Some people have described
fashion as a “language,” “code,” or “system”158 because choices about
dress can, like words, communicate ideas and statements.  Like words,
fashion has symbolic meanings.159  However, these meanings shift
over time, and sometimes even with the season, or with the social and
political context.160  For instance, “cowboy” attire once signified sub-
scription to a code of honor, independence, rugged individualism,
and other “Western” cultural values.161  But for a few years, when
these clothes were worn in New York City, they more often than not
signified membership in a mostly white youth hipster culture found in
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186–87 (1999) (recon-
firming that First Amendment protection is “at its zenith” for “core political speech” like
the circulation of a petition); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553–55
(2001) (denying commercial speech full First Amendment protection).
156. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (Kennikat Press 1972) (1948) (examining the role that freedom of speech
plays in the functioning and structure of our political system).
157. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 78, at 3–5 (emphasizing the importance of protecting all R
speech, including cultural communications); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination:
Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 37–43, 46–48 (2002) (arguing that artistic ex-
pression and commercial speech must be protected even when not political, as exercises of
the freedom of imagination).
158. See generally RUTH P. RUBINSTEIN, DRESS CODES: MEANINGS AND MESSAGES IN AMERI-
CAN CULTURE 6–7 (1995) (using semiotics to attempt to develop “a systematic understand-
ing of clothing images and meanings in American society,” and describing the “language”
of clothing as well as its “vocabulary”). See also BARTHES, supra note 13, at 254–55 (discuss- R
ing the characters that fashion allows the wearer to embody).
159. See ANSPACH, supra note 5, at xiv–xv (discussing fashion as a symbol). R
160. See id. (describing the circular flow of fashion); LAUER & LAUER, supra note 123, at R
36 (noting that what clothes communicate varies by place and time within stable catego-
ries). See generally KATHY PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR: THE MAKING OF AMERICA’S BEAUTY CULTURE
(1998) [hereinafter PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR] (tracking the changing meaning of cosmetics in
America, from an accepted practice for men and women, to an immoral practice for men
and women signifying aristocratic excess and racially animated fear of female sexuality and
trickery, to an accepted practice for women that “reveals” inner beauty, and finally to a
naturalized, largely gendered practice for women).
161. Museum of the American West, How the West Was Worn, http://
www.museumoftheamericanwest.org/explore/exhibits/archive/westworn.html (last visited
Oct. 24, 2006) (“Rooted in the fundamental, historic American mythic conditions of ‘rug-
ged individualism,’ Western wear and the pioneers who made this style fashionable are the
source of inspiration for those shaping American identity at home and abroad.”).
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the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn, New York.162  Wearing visible,
colored makeup was once deemed acceptable for both men and wo-
men in Western cultures.163  Then, in America especially, it was
deemed immoral and duplicitous.  The term “painted woman” even
became synonymous with prostitute.164  Eventually, it became not only
common for women to wear makeup in America, but encouraged, it
being described as necessary to their mental health or essential to the
war effort,165 and even required in some businesses.166
The symbols of personal appearance are imprecise in meaning
because, like words, the meaning is not inherent to the symbol; it de-
pends on context, and even then the words mean different things to
different people.167  For instance, many have debated whether minis-
kirts, makeup, and other choices about personal appearance that are
understood by many as “sexually provocative” are liberating or deni-
grating to women,168 just as some have debated whether headscarves
and other clothes deemed to be “modest” by most are denigrating or
liberating.169  Imprecision and contextual contingency of meaning
can be identified within verbal languages, but communication
through dress is imprecise to another degree.
Beyond the degree of imprecision, however, there is an extremely
important difference between expression via personal appearance
choices and expression via words, one that is highly relevant to law:
“Each person who adopts a fashion interprets the meaning in her own
way and sends the message on in altered form.  Fashion has a way of so
162. See ROBERT LANHAM, THE HIPSTER HANDBOOK 93, 111 (2003) (illustrating hipster
culture and identifying its prevalence in certain cities).
163. Kathy Peiss, Making Up, Making Over: Cosmetics, Consumer Culture, and Women’s Iden-
tity, in THE SEX OF THINGS 311, 315 (Victoria de Grazia & Ellen Furlough eds., 1996) [here-
inafter Peiss, Making Up, Making Over].
164. Id.
165. PAULA BLACK, THE BEAUTY INDUSTRY 34 (2004); PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR, supra note 160, R
at 240–42; see also Library of Congress, Rosie the Riveter: Real Women Workers in World
War II, http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/journey/rosie-transcript.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2006) (transcript of Sheridan Harvey video presentation).
166. E.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 392 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (Ne-
vada casino’s policy required women beverage servers to wear makeup); PEISS, HOPE IN A
JAR, supra note 160, at 240–42 (“Even the All-American Girls Professional Baseball League, R
organized during the war, ordered women ballplayers to take makeup lessons from Helena
Rubinstein and to appear ladylike on the field.”).
167. See ANSPACH, supra note 5, at 240 (noting that “symbols do not mean the same thing R
to all people at all times”).
168. CAROLYN G. HEILBRUN, THE EDUCATION OF A WOMAN: THE LIFE OF GLORIA STEINEM,
at xviii (1995) (describing Steinem’s “feminis[m] in a miniskirt” as a walking
“contradiction”).
169. See generally FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE (1999) (dis-
cussing the evolution of differing views pertaining to veiling practices).
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identifying with the wearer that it appears to be an integral part of the
personality.”170  As I would put it, the difference between verbal lan-
guage and the language of dress is one of form.  Statements in the
language of dress use a more subjective and personal form than state-
ments made in word language.  They are somehow akin to statements
that always have the word “I” in them.  Such as, “I am a cowgirl,” or “I
feel happy today,” or “I don’t want to be noticed,” or “I want to call
attention to myself,” or “I’m not trying to say anything at all.”  The
clothes I wear never simply make the statement: “The war is wrong.”
They make the statement, “I think the war is wrong.”
One might object to my claim about the subjective form of dress
by pointing to the fact that when a model wears clothes, he or she
makes no personal, subjective statement.  Indeed, he or she often did
not even choose the items exhibited on his or her body.  However, I
am not making any claims about art, including fashion shows, that
makes use of clothing, hair, and other such items in general.  Rather,
I am exploring choices of self-presentation.  Thus, an artwork or fash-
ion show in which clothes, hair, makeup, piercings, and even tattoos
are exhibited on models does not come within the borders of the
right I am exploring.  Such activity might of course come within the
borders of other rights, such as artistic or political expression under
the First Amendment, but I am exploring specifically the right to ma-
nipulate one’s own image.
A further objection might find the fact of the subjective form of
dress expressions inconsequential.  But differences of form, especially
the difference between subjective and objective form, are highly sig-
nificant.  Those who are careful writers know that even the smallest
change in form—such as adding a paragraph break—can make a dif-
ference.  When it comes to a choice concerning the objectivity or sub-
jectivity of a form, most of us care even more: Few think that a
documentary passing itself off as objective journalism should be
judged by the same criteria as a movie passing itself off as a personal
documentary about the filmmaker’s experience, or a documentary
that interrogates the very notion of objectivity.  The form of the film
tells us something about what it communicates and what we seek from
and expect of it.  And indeed, if I say, “the war is wrong,” I am not
communicating the same thing as when I say, “I believe the war is
wrong.”  Adding the subjective “I believe” qualifies my statement, and
in many contexts, implies less or even no obligation on the listener’s
part to agree or disagree.  On the other hand, it calls attention to my
170. ANSPACH, supra note 5, at 241. R
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personal belief, which makes the statement stronger along some
measures.
Various forms of self-presentation might also be understood as a
form of artistic expression, which, like speech, is protected under the
First Amendment.171  Of course, there are far fewer satisfying theories
of why art, as opposed to speech, is protected under the First Amend-
ment, but they are not non-existent, and theories protecting art tend
to be a bit more generous about what kind of expression is important
to freedom.172
Some persons put a great deal of imagination and creativity into
the way they dress, wear their hair, or otherwise present themselves in
public.  They may do so for aesthetic reasons, for the personal enjoy-
ment they receive from the creative acts, to make political statements,
or to communicate emotions, allegiances, or ideas.  It is undeniable
that such persons are engaging in a form of artistic expression via
their dress, amateur or not.  Moreover, “lowbrow” art receives no less
protection under most understandings of the proper protection of art
in our society than “highbrow” art.173  So, it matters little that the art
most of us produce when we dress in the morning is about as deriva-
tive as it gets.  Perhaps, no matter what its value, dress is a kind of
artistic expression.
However, thinking of dress as a kind of art does nothing to solve
the problem identified with equating dress and speech.  Art, like
speech, is not restricted to the deeply subjective form, or anything like
it, that is the manipulation of one’s own personal appearance.  Dress
expressions are explicitly personal and subjective in form, whether ar-
tistic or not, and putting something on or altering one’s own body is a
unique form of expression that communicates affiliation, commit-
ment, and self-definition in a way other kinds of art cannot.  Personal
appearance manipulation happens in an entirely different system of
meaning than does sculpture.  It is nowhere near the same thing to
put a hat on one’s head as to put it on a pedestal in a museum.174
171. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (describing the “painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Scho¨enberg, or Jab-
berwocky verse of Lewis Carroll” as “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment).
172. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 157, at 35–37 (arguing that both high-value and low- R
brow art are equally protected as art because they are all exercises of the freedom of
imagination).
173. Id.
174. LAUER & LAUER, supra note 123, at 39 (“There is a vast difference between the R
costume in the closet and when it is worn.  That difference is the spirit of the wearer.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Why does it matter for the law that dress is a uniquely subjective
form?  First, as a general matter, what distinguishes dress from speech
doesn’t sound like an argument for heightened intrusion on the right.
Under a liberal theory of personal autonomy, it is an argument for
heightened protection of the right.  And even under a republican the-
ory of rights as promoting the public good, it is clearly useful for citi-
zens to have the option of signifying their deep personal commitment
to an expression by manipulating their personal appearance.  And yet,
the treatment of dress within free speech law has always been as some
kind of adjunct form of speech, less important than “pure speech.”175
Second, the subjective form of dress becomes relevant in arenas
like the private workplace.  While there are many limitations on gov-
ernment regulation of speech in the public sphere, there are few limi-
tations on private regulation of speech, such as employer rules about
what employees can say, due to the “state action” doctrine.  The state
action doctrine makes governmental action contributing to the in-
fringement of a right into an element of any claim that a fundamental
right such as speech, art, or privacy has been infringed in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.176  I believe there are three major argu-
ments for this doctrine.
First, to protect the right to self-presentation, or speech, in the
private sphere would, one might argue, interfere with other rights,
such as property and contract.  Many persons before me have compe-
tently argued that the exercise of certain fundamental rights by work-
ers must at least be balanced against market forces and employer
preferences, given that we spend such a great deal of time at work and
given that, after all, we are balancing one right against another, such
as property versus speech, contract versus speech, or property versus
privacy.177  When weighing property and contract rights against other
175. E.g., sources cited supra note 151. R
176. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(“Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment scru-
tiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not.”).
177. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 505–06
(1985) (arguing for elimination of the state action requirement in general); Terry Ann
Halbert, The First Amendment in the Workplace: An Analysis and Call for Reform, 17 SETON HALL
L. REV. 42, 66–72 (1987) (questioning the state action requirement and proposing legisla-
tive reform as the best solution to shrinking opportunities for inexpensive exercises of free
speech); Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 66–70 (1990) (arguing that public
and private institutional actors, especially private employers, should be treated alike when
they infringe an individual’s constitutional rights); Peller & Tushnet, supra note 56, at 793 R
(arguing that the state action concept is incoherent given the need for state enforcement
of background contract and property rules); cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due
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rights, a balance must be struck.  For instance, the right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of race is balanced against various
other rights in this country, such as contract, property, marital privacy,
and the right to send a child to private school.  In the case of contract,
the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race is almost
always deemed more important, and thus § 1982 and Title VII are the
law of the land.178  In the case of property, again, the right to be free
from discrimination is almost always deemed more important, and
thus we have the Fair Housing Act.179  On the other hand, in the case
of marital privacy, the privacy is considered more important, and thus
no law prohibits persons from choosing their spouse for race-
conscious or even blatantly racist reasons.
There are good reasons why contract and property are consid-
ered less important than the right to be free from discrimination.
The areas of housing, employment, and contract-making form so
much of a person’s life in this country that if we have not secured the
right to be free from race discrimination in these spheres, we are
barely free from discrimination at all.  When rights concerning per-
sonal autonomy and public participation come into conflict with
property and contract rights, the importance of personal autonomy
and public participation should not immediately fall by the wayside.
A second argument for the state action doctrine is one about the
institutional competence of the judicial branch.  The idea here is that
judges are not well-suited to balance all these different interests, espe-
cially economic interests; the state action doctrine reins judges in, al-
lowing them to protect fundamental rights whenever the government
interferes with them in the absence of a compelling interest like pub-
lic safety or order, while preventing them from striking improper bal-
ances between rights like speech, privacy, property, and contract.180
However, this argument is simply an argument about which branch of
government we should complain to when we believe rights like speech
and privacy are being infringed.  It means that we can complain to
judges when there is state action but that we should complain to legis-
lators when there is not state action.181  And of course, this is what
Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 106–14 (1995) (providing a normative argument
for the value of free speech in the workplace).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e).
179. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.
180. But see Peller & Tushnet, supra note 56, at 794–95 (explaining and rejecting this R
argument as failing to address the democratic legitimacy of a regime in which economic
inequality is not addressed).
181. West, supra note 57, at 829 (noting that dealing with welfare rights is within the R
purview of legislatures, not courts).
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people often do.  When it comes to freedom from race discrimina-
tion, many of our rights are protected in the private sphere by statutes
that were passed by legislators, such as the Fair Housing Act,182 rather
than by constitutional doctrine.
There is a third argument though, specific to speech and art, for
why even legislators should not protect those rights in private realms,
especially in the private workplace.  To do so, the argument goes,
would violate the speech rights of the property holder or employer.
The theory is that when an employee speaks in the workplace, his or
her speech is imputable to the employer because the employee repre-
sents the employer.183  This is especially the case when the employee
deals with customers, or when the employee is a supervisor dealing
with other employees.  Thus, we generally cannot try to simply bal-
ance economic rights or activity against speech rights, as any protec-
tion of employee or nonproperty holder speech rights would interfere
with the employer’s or property holder’s speech rights by compelling
speech that he or she does not wish to make.184
Here is where the subjective form of dress is relevant.  The ex-
pressions of an individual via dress—even if they are like art or like
verbal language—are not as easily imputable to others as traditional
art and speech.  For instance, when an employee wears a colorfully
painted t-shirt, this expression is not as easily confused with that of the
employer as it would be if the employee hung a painting on the em-
ployer’s premises, or even pinned the same t-shirt to the wall.  When a
cashier wears an eyebrow ring, customers will not impute this expres-
sion to the employer the way they might if she said to every passing
customer, “The war is wrong.”
Of course, this is not to say that what an employee wears cannot
reflect on her employer.  Indeed, whether it reflects on her employer
will, in large part, be determined by the law: If an employer can tell an
employee what to wear, which it usually can in the present legal con-
text, we are more likely to impute employee dress to the employer
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619.
183. E.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that
Costco could not accommodate, without undue hardship, an employee’s desire to wear an
eyebrow ring for religious reasons because the employee’s appearance is imputed to the
employer).
184. For instance, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court rejected a
privately owned shopping center’s claim that its speech rights were violated by a California
law that required the shopping center to permit individuals to exercise speech and petition
rights on its property on the grounds that “[t]he views expressed by members of the public
in passing out pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition . . . will not likely be identified
with those of the owner,” and that “no specific message is dictated by the State to be dis-
played on [the] property.”  447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).
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than if employers could not tell employees what to wear.  This role of
law in constructing the authorship of a particular communicative mes-
sage is familiar in the First Amendment context. PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins185 involved the case of a shopping center that was re-
quired under California law to provide access to political demonstra-
tors.  The Supreme Court rejected the shopping center owner’s
argument that such a rule compelled it to author speech with which it
did not agree.186  Yet the law itself played a large role in constructing
this situation: It is precisely because the shopping center was required
to provide access that most observers would not impute the political
demonstrator’s beliefs to the center owner.
My point is that because dress has a largely subjective form, stem-
ming from its use of the human body, we could, given the legal con-
struct to assist us, quite easily distinguish employee dress from
employer sanction in most cases.  And, given its crucial role in form-
ing and reforming both the physical and psychological self, we ought
to.  The relevant question seems not to be whether businesses may
create an image of their choosing and communicate ideas of their
choosing, but rather whether businesses can co-opt the bodies of their
employees to communicate those ideas.
Similarly, in public schools, fear that student speech will be misat-
tributed to schools and therefore interfere with both socialization and
pedagogical goals has sometimes served to justify restrictions on that
speech.187  But this concern is usually inapplicable to student exer-
cises of the freedom of dress, due to its subjective form.
In sum, the subjective form that dress uses to convey its meaning
makes it a far less transferable expression than speech or art more
generally.  This strengthens the argument for giving some measure of
protection to dress in realms like private workplaces and public
schools.  Treating dress as equivalent to speech or art is then inade-
quate as a matter of legal theory.
185. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
186. Id. at 87–88.
187. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988) (explain-
ing that the school, as publisher of the student newspaper, had the right to censor a stu-
dent’s article, which discussed student pregnancy and the effects of divorce on students at
the school, to ensure “that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attrib-
uted to the school,” and also noting that a school might need to disassociate itself from
speech that is “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or
prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences”); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683–85 (1986) (arguing that, as an older high school
student giving a speech at a school assembly at which younger, fourteen-year-old students
were present, Fraser was “inescapably” like a “teacher[ ],” a “role model[ ],” and that the
school acted properly to “disassociate itself” from the student’s sexually suggestive speech).
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F. Is “Freedom” of Dress an Illusion?
Perhaps I have been too optimistic.  After all, even if our freedom
of dress is protected in certain ways, clothing, hairstyling, jewelry, and
makeup all cost money.  Perhaps dress is so corrupted by the unequal
distribution of wealth in America that any imagined “freedom” we
have is an illusion.  Perhaps, in the end, it is only the rich who have a
freedom of dress, and dress is just one more way they make the poor
feel bad and reify their class status.  Alternatively, or perhaps simulta-
neously, freedom of dress may be so corrupted by gender and other
systems of social limitation that it can never really be “free.”
Similar claims have been made about speech,188 and one might
argue that they are even stronger when it comes to dress, given that
clothing, jewelry, makeup, and the like can cost considerable amounts
of money.  Under this theory, the state might actually best promote
freedom by interfering with capitalist, sexist, and racist regimes, and
ensuring some equality when it comes to dress, through regulation.189
Thus, school uniforms, or even citizen uniforms for all, might be a
good choice, as they would prevent the wealthy from exercising free-
dom of dress at the social expense of the poor,190 and would prevent
sexist norms from encouraging women to make “false” choices that
lead to their subordination.  Perhaps these uniforms could be ex-
punged of potentially gender-subordinating elements like makeup,
headscarves, and corsets.
Unfortunately, this type of benevolent aim does not always oper-
ate to serve the goals of equality when it comes to cultural practices
like dress.  When it comes to speech, the government can intrude on
the market to provide broadcast access, thereby attempting, at least, to
give airtime to a diversity of content.191  When it comes to dress, how-
188. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1412
(1986) (“I think it fair to say that in a capitalist society, the protection of autonomy will on
the whole produce a public debate that is dominated by those who are economically pow-
erful.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1985) (describing an absolutist or “neutral” version of the First Amendment
as “the systematic defense of those who own the speech because they can buy it or have
speech to lose because they have the power to articulate in a way that counts”).
189. But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949,
963 (1995) (arguing that governmental attempts to regulate speech using a market-based
approach are ineffective because speech is not a fungible commodity).
190. See Alison M. Barbarosh, Undressing the First Amendment in Public Schools: Do Uniform
Dress Codes Violate Students’ First Amendment Rights?, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1415, 1439 (1995)
(discussing the argument in favor of school uniforms); Miller, supra note 7, at 670 (same). R
191. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389–90, 396 (1969) (upholding FCC
licensing and regulation of broadcasters, including the fairness doctrine, as promoting
First Amendment values rather than violating the First Amendment).
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ever, I argue that government intrusion is more like state-run televi-
sion than state-regulated television.
In the case of uniforms and dress code, the government intrudes
on the market not as a neutral provider of access and promoter of
diversity, but rather to remove certain kinds of content altogether and
replace it with dress that is deemed more appropriate.  Although this
restriction on dress leads to a kind of equality, I argue that it is worse
than the state in which unequal initial entitlements lead to unequal
exercises of the freedom of dress.  State-enforced equality of dress at-
taches permanent meaning to practices that could otherwise be the
site of cultural flourishing and experimentation with new identities.  I
do not deny the effects of inequality altogether, and that is why I de-
mand some protection of freedom of dress in the workplace, in order
to soften the effects of major sites of power on appearance choices.
“Neither the individual nor the society can rely for the security of our
dress freedom upon the so-called free market.  When vast differences
in the respective sartorial powers of corporations and persons are pal-
pably omnipresent, the non-interventionist principle is a dress author-
itarian’s charter.”192  But to sacrifice dress choices completely in favor
of equality poses its own problems.
First, queer theorists have noted the troubling fact that the capi-
talist market has actually opened up venues for flourishing queer cul-
ture and expression that are integral to queer identity.193  It simply
cannot be denied that gay men especially, and some lesbians, have
found a refuge of sorts in many sectors of the market, such as bars,
certain parts of the movie industry, and cable television.194
I attempt in this Article to take a “post-queer, post-Marxist, post-
feminist” view, one that recognizes that the existence of “private”
spheres in which background inequality persists can nevertheless con-
tribute to human flourishing, but also acknowledges and interrogates
the effects of capitalist, racist, and sexist systems on the end results of
that flourishing.  This view acknowledges that gay men and lesbians
have found much of their visible flourishing within a capitalist system,
but also that this system has contributed to a gay culture that appears
192. Keenan, supra note 82, at 189. R
193. See Alan Sears, Queer Anti-Capitalism: What’s Left of Lesbian and Gay Liberation?, 69 SCI.
& SOC’Y 92, 103–05 (2005) (lamenting the “commodification of queer life” (citing Michael
Warner, Introduction, in FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET, at vii, xxxi n.28 (Michael Warner ed.,
1993))); see also John D’Emilio, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
READER, supra note 38, at 467, 473–75 (noting that although capitalism has opened up R
identity expression possibilities for gays and lesbians, it has also further increased heterose-
xism and homophobia).
194. Sears, supra note 193, at 104–05. R
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to idolize the white, the wealthy, and the superficial.  One only needs
to watch Queer Eye for the Straight Guy,195 an immensely popular televi-
sion show that ridicules and chastises men who fail to spend all their
disposable income on clothes, furniture, and other material goods, to
realize that the versions of gay culture that have risen to the highest
levels of mainstream acceptance within the capitalist system are not
entirely rosy.  Similarly, the sitcom Will and Grace196 long enjoyed a
prime time spot on a major broadcast network, but a main character’s
race- and class-based abuse of her Hispanic maid was played for laughs
again and again, and it’s simply not clear that the joke was ironic.
When it comes to eradicating gender subordination from dress
choices, again, there are deep problems both with direct state intru-
sion and with leaving the private sphere to its own devices.  Feminists
have been right, for a long time, that enforced appearance standards
for women do a great deal of the work of constructing their subordi-
nated status as women.197  However, these feminists are wrong to the
extent they reject the possibility of cosmetics, corsets, high heels, and
other ultra-feminine forms of dress as legitimate choices for women,
rather than the products of false consciousness.198  They are wrong,
but not for the typical answer given: that such items are a great way for
women to “use their sexuality as power,” or more convincingly, to sim-
ply embrace it.199  Those who reject women’s dress that signifies sexu-
ality are wrong because the wholesale rejection of these forms of
appearance manipulation smacks of an earlier, but also subordinat-
ing, set of appearance standards for women.
Before women were encouraged to dress provocatively and sexu-
ally, they were discouraged from doing so, and not for feminist rea-
sons.  In nineteenth-century America, women were discouraged from
doing so because of a moral code that equated the internal goodness
and value of women with their external appearance.200  Women with
pale, luminous skin got that way by being chaste and morally pure,
and women who were chaste and morally pure developed pale, lumi-
195. Queer Eye for the Straight Guy (Bravo cable television network).
196. Will and Grace (NBC television).
197. See, e.g., GILMAN, supra note 12, at 110–17 (questioning why women willingly acqui- R
esce to the force of fashion).
198. See Joy of Resistance:  Interview with Radical Feminist Carol Hanisch (WBAI 99.5 radio
broadcast July 2003), available at http://www.afn.org/~iguana/archives/2003_08/
20030815.html [hereinafter Hanisch Interview].
199. PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR, supra note 160, at 156–59; Peiss, Making Up, Making Over, supra R
note 163, at 313. R
200. PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR, supra note 160, at 24; Peiss, Making Up, Making Over, supra R
note 163, at 313. R
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nous skin.201  Within this morality, the use of “artifice” such as cosmet-
ics or corsets to alter the appearance was deemed a dangerous,
feminine sort of trickery, and fear of this “deception” was animated by
racist anxiety about passing.202  But this morality did not promote
equality.  Rather, it valued women for their appearance, sexual purity,
and white racial purity.
Thus, when Carol Hanisch criticizes the notion of women using
their sexuality for power as dating back to Jezebel,203 she references a
character that has long played a role in sexist and racist mythologies
telling women how to behave.204  The provocative and sexual dress of
women does not necessarily celebrate sexual “power.”  Hanisch is cor-
rect to point out that such an assumption buys into a construction of
women’s sexual desire as only serving others’ ends.  However, we must
accept these forms of dress for what they often purport to be—either
the exercise of freedom and choice or the ironic reference to and
subversion of past strict appearance codes.  The alternative is to
ascribe a single, stable meaning to these practices, and to recommend
their replacement with another essentializing female ideal, just as
problematic as the sexualized one.
Employers have forbidden women from bringing makeup to work
for fear that feminine obsession with appearance would distract them
from the job,205 and employers have required women to wear makeup
at work in order to signal that, although they are working, they still
understand that their status is woman.206 Both of these restrictions on
women’s choices should offend feminists as a kind of psychic re-
minder that women are not people who primarily belong in the
workplace.
Thus, while my view acknowledges the value of private cultural
expression via the freedom of dress, even where that expression oc-
curs in a context of inequality, it does require some interference with
those who retain the economic power to privately manipulate and co-
erce the appearance choices we make.  The interference I propose is
to protect the freedom of dress in the private workplace, in order to
diminish the control that employers have over the appearance choices
201. PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR, supra note 160, at 24. R
202. Id. at 31–32.
203. Hanisch Interview, supra note 198. R
204. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438 (1991).
205. See PEISS, HOPE IN A JAR, supra note 160, at 242–43 (noting complaints that wartime R
working women spent too much time “making up” at work).
206. See id. at 193 (discussing women’s appearance requirements at work in the 1920s
and 1930s).
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of their workers, but to leave other private spheres largely un-
touched.207  Thus, while I accept the fact that dress choices will inevi-
tably be made in a state of inequality, I wish to protect the right to
cobble together whatever freedom of dress expression we may within
our means and still make a living.  Moreover, protecting freedom of
dress in the workplace is particularly useful for the ends I argue this
freedom serves—promoting freedom to participate in cultural con-
frontation and construction.  Due to antidiscrimination laws like Title
VII, work is a place where adult Americans of different races, genders,
religions, and nationalities must confront and learn from each other.
Work is, for many Americans, like a “public” space in this sense.208
Protecting freedom of dress in this zone ideally promotes the dynamic
culture that is the goal of carving out a freedom of dress in the first
place.
* * *
How should we apply this theory of the self-presentation right in
particular instances?  The notion that there are two sorts of constitu-
tional rights—fundamental ones, subject to strict scrutiny, and
nonfundamental ones, subject to rational basis review—is simply not
true anymore, if it ever was.209  The right to vote is a fundamental
right, but review of voting regulations now occurs in a “two-tiered”
manner: regulations that “directly” target the voting right are subject
to strict scrutiny, while regulations pertaining to ballot access are sub-
ject to rational basis review.210  The right to an abortion is a funda-
mental right, but review of abortion regulation also occurs in a two-
tiered manner.  Regulations justified by the goals of maternal health
or fetal life are assessed under the “undue burden” standard, while
other sorts of regulations would presumably be assessed under a strict
scrutiny standard.211
Thus, it simply will not do to state, as many federal courts have,
that there is a liberty interest in personal appearance, but that it is not
207. In the realm of public accommodations, however, citizens might be able to make
either “hybrid,” see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990), or disparate
impact claims.
208. See Estlund, supra note 177, at 112 (“The workplace functions not only as a self- R
governing institution and as a regulated institution; it also functions as a crucial intermedi-
ate institution that stands between the individual and the state.”).
209. See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 868 (1994) (characterizing courts’ treatment
of rights that are subject to differing levels of scrutiny as “indistinct”).
210. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
211. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874–78 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
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“fundamental,” and to therefore assume that a rational basis of review
applies.212  More realistically, as some federal courts have realized, the
standard of review will vary by context.213  Some courts have stated
that the standard might vary based on whether the regulation is di-
rected at citizens at large or at public employees.214  Others have
claimed it varies based on whether the regulation is directed at law
enforcement officials or other sorts of public employees.215  Some
courts have stated that the standard of review in schools is rational
basis, yet others have said it is strict scrutiny.216 Still others have distin-
guished the review given in high school cases from college cases.217
Some courts have scrutinized regulations on student dress with
greater skepticism than regulations on teacher dress, given the con-
tractual nature of the teacher’s relationship to the state,218 while other
courts have held that if students have a freedom of dress, it obviously
follows that teachers would have the same freedom.219
The contextual variation in the standard of review needs to be
more deeply rooted in a theory of why the right is important in the
first place; therefore, figuring out what to do about the freedom of
dress requires providing that theory.  I have attempted to do so in this
Part.  In the next four Parts, I will apply that theory to a few contexts
to show some of the payoff of the theory.
212. See, e.g., DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, 812 F.2d 1365, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing a non-fundamental interest in freedom of dress).
213. E.g., Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The appro-
priate standard [of review] depends, in part, on context and circumstances.”); Rathert v.
Village of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515–16 (7th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the context of
the transaction at issue, more than the right infringed, informs the standard of review a
court applies).
214. E.g., Rathert, 903 F.2d at 516 (differentiating police officers from the public at
large); Tardif v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 763 (1st Cir. 1976) (distinguishing personal appear-
ance in an individual sense from that of a high school teacher in a contractual
relationship).
215. See, e.g., Lowman v. Davies, 704 F.2d 1044, 1046 (8th Cir. 1983) (“Because the park
naturalist has law enforcement duties, we believe that Kelley [v. Johnson] is controlling.”).
216. Compare E. Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 858–59 (2d Cir.
1977) (en banc) (applying rational basis review to a student dress code), with Breen v.
Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969) (imposing a “substantial burden of justification”
on school officials to justify a student dress code (internal quotation marks omitted)).
217. E.g., Domico v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 675 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[A]t
the public college level, hairstyle regulations cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, be
justified by the school’s asserted educational and disciplinary needs, while in the public
elementary and secondary schools, such regulations are always justified by the school’s
needs.”).
218. Tardif, 545 F.2d at 763.
219. E.g., Hander v. San Jacinto Junior Coll., 519 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (“If
college freshmen are treated as members of the adult population, college teachers a forti-
ori enjoy this status.”).
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To exhaust every hypothetical context concerning the freedom of
dress would be impossible.  As such, I have chosen to discuss four im-
portant ones—worker rights to dress, direct state regulation of dress,
public school student rights to dress, and prisoner rights to dress.
These examples will demonstrate how we might differently look at the
law in these areas with a more complete theory of the unique impor-
tance of the freedom of dress.
IV. FREEDOM OF DRESS IN THE WORKPLACE
Traditionally, that a right is important, even fundamental, does
not mean its exercise is protected in a “private” sphere such as the
workplace.220  For instance, the right to free speech is a well-
established fundamental right, but federal case law currently does not
protect private employees’ exercise of speech rights at the work-
place.221  It is only in public workplaces that the First Amendment has
much traction.222
However, as I explained in Part III.E, a crucial argument for
keeping free speech law out of the private workplace does not apply to
the freedom of dress.  Because of its subjective form, dress, more so
than speech and other behaviors, can be carved out as a zone of em-
ployee freedom that does not reflect on the employer, given the right
legal construct.  While arguments about judicial competence to bal-
ance fundamental freedoms against rights like property, contract, and
the promotion of various industries still apply to the freedom of dress,
this does not mean there is nobody to argue to for protection of the
freedom of dress.  Legislators, at state and federal levels, can protect
the freedom of dress by providing statutory rights to freedom of dress
and directing a balance between those rights and economic rights.
Politically achieving these protections is more possible than one might
expect.  A poll conducted by Employment Law Alliance, a network of
law firms that engage in labor and employment law practice, found
that thirty-three percent of responders believed those who are over-
weight, not physically attractive, or look or dress unconventionally
220. See generally Peller & Tushnet, supra note 56 (describing the state action doctrine). R
221. See, e.g., Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (noting that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments limit state action, not action taken on private property
for private purposes).
222. One of the seminal cases holding that public employees retain some form of First
Amendment protection on the job is Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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should be given special government protection against discrimination
and retaliation at work.223
In the next Section, I argue that freedom of dress can be pro-
tected in the workplace using a reasonable accommodation approach
coupled with specific exemptions for particular sorts of jobs.
A. Enforcing Fundamental Rights in the Private Sphere: The Forgotten
Role of Legislators and the Reasonable Accommodation Approach
Employees need to work to make a living in a capitalist society,
and that work is a large part of their public life, a life in which dress
can be extremely important.  Thus, to have the freedom of dress un-
necessarily restricted in the workplace is to burden the freedom of
dress too much, I argue.  With adults spending most of the day unable
to exercise the freedom of dress, it is hard to realize the democratic
benefits of the right.
One might counter my argument with the claim that whether or
not we feel choices about our appearance are important or meaning-
ful, we should live with the consequences of those choices in the pri-
vate realm.  That is, for some, what it means to have choice.  However,
this position misunderstands the nature of the state’s role in the mat-
ter.  The state places limits on the consequences of our choices in
order that we retain freedom against private threats to that freedom.
If someone punches us because of what we say, the state will protect
us, both because this protects our personal autonomy and because it
promotes open debate.  We would not have an acceptably strong right
to free speech, I argue, if the state failed to protect us from the vio-
lence of others angry with what we have to say.  The state’s failure
would be damaging both to our personal autonomy to say what we like
and to the goal of open debate.  Similarly, if someone fires us because
we choose not to have sex with them, the state will again protect us.
We would not have an acceptable level of employment opportunity if
we were constantly forced to choose between coerced sex and a job.
Personal appearance choices are choices that depend on an idea
of individual existence, but also acknowledge dependence on the gaze
of others for that existence to have meaning.  Freedom of dress thus
contributes to open cultural confrontation—with others and with one-
223. Employment Law Alliance, National Poll Shows Public Opinion Sharply Divided on Regu-
lating Appearance—From Weight to Tattoos—in the Workplace, figs. (Mar. 22, 2005), http://
www.employmentlawalliance.com/pdf/ELALooksPollCharts2-3_16_2005.pdf.  These opin-
ions were not evenly distributed by gender or race: Women favor employee rights more
than men, and non-whites favor employee rights more than whites do.  Those with less
education and lower status jobs also favor greater employee rights.
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self.  I argue that to sustain the vitality of dress as a means of identity
formation and reformation, the state must step in to guarantee some
measure of self-control and authority over our body and its borders,
even against private restriction.  Of course, it must do so without so
broadly limiting the consequences of our self-presentation that those
choices become meaningless.  The compromise I choose is that the
state intervenes in the workplace, but not in other “private” realms.
The workplace is such an important part of our public lives that
having some minimal protections in this arena will go far toward pro-
moting freedom of dress.  Thanks to antidiscrimination laws, people
of different races, genders, nationalities, and in some locales, sexual
orientations, come together in the workplace to engage in common
enterprises.224  Providing workers with more responsibility and agency
over the self-image they bring to the workplace improves the opportu-
nities for meaningful cultural exposure and confrontation.  But we
must also recognize that the business an employer owns or controls
may be the site of other forms of important communication and
expression.
If worker freedom of dress is truly interfering with core job func-
tions and the core goals of the enterprise in question, then I believe
we should not protect employee dress.  To do so might eliminate or
heavily burden certain sectors of the market, such as the entertain-
ment and clothing industries.  Eliminating these sectors would be
counterproductive to the freedom of dress, as they often provide a
venue for the codification of dress meanings.  Protecting the freedom
of dress might also pose safety problems in certain industries.
On the other hand, there are many instances where an employer
might rationally wish to regulate employee choices concerning per-
sonal appearance, but where preventing the employer from doing so
would not unduly burden the industry as a whole.  For instance, wait-
ers and waitresses, bartenders, cashiers, and many other service em-
ployees are often required to wear uniforms.  Uniforms might provide
some marginal benefits in terms of keeping employees “in line,” and
the oft-repeated claim that “customers like uniforms” may indeed be
true in some instances.  But if no employer could require uniforms of
these sorts of employees, customers would, I predict, grow accus-
tomed to the lack of uniforms, and the businesses in question would
not be harmed.  Customers go to restaurants primarily for food, not to
224. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 17 (2000) (arguing that “even the partial demographic integration that does
exist in the workplace yields far more social integration—actual interracial interaction and
friendship—than any other domain of American society”).
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be served by people in uniforms.  If there were few restaurants with
waitstaff in uniforms, customers would still eat out.
Additionally, sacrificing minimal amounts of economic efficiency
that might be obtained by the use of uniforms in order to protect
worker dress choices is the kind of sacrifice that protection of rights
like the freedom of dress entails.  Problems of permitting easy cus-
tomer identification of employees can often be solved with much nar-
rower intrusions on workers’ freedom of dress, such as identification
tags.  All this seems to point to the fact that questions of when accom-
modating dress choices is too burdensome to an employer, how much
accommodation is “reasonable,” and how much accommodation is
“unreasonable,” can only be answered on a case-by-case basis.
The law has encountered this sort of problem before, in the case
of protecting worker rights to religious freedom;225 I propose a similar
solution for protecting worker rights to freedom of dress.  Specifically,
I propose balancing the freedom of dress against employer interests
by using a reasonable accommodation standard, and by exempting a
select number of jobs from the accommodation requirement: those
jobs in which the core function of the employee is to have his or her
body co-opted for the purpose of employer expression, such as model-
ing and acting.  Readers will of course disagree about how stringent
the reasonable accommodation standard should be and what sort of
businesses should get the benefit of the statutory exemption.  The
main point I would like readers to take away, however, is that employ-
ers should, at the very least, have to make an attempt at accommoda-
tion.  Currently, they do not have to accommodate an employee’s self-
presentation at all, even when dress is religiously motivated,226 and
this is unreasonable, given the personal and subjective form of dress.
B. Models, Actors, Performance Art, the Dinner Theatre, and Advertising:
When the Core Job Function is About Dress
In general, when employees exercise the freedom of dress, the
expressive rights of employers and property holders are not impli-
cated in the same way that they are when employees exercise speech
rights.227  This is because of the subjective form that dress takes.  How-
ever, there are exceptions to this general rule—when one of the core
225. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000) (couching the defined scope of the right to relig-
ious freedom in the workplace in terms of reasonable accommodation).
226. E.g., Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that
allowing an employee to wear facial jewelry to accommodate the employee’s religious prac-
tices would impose an undue hardship on the employer).
227. See supra Part III.E.
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job functions of an employee is to have his or her body, including the
way it is dressed and adorned, co-opted for the employer’s purposes.
Of course, many employers wish to co-opt their employees’ bodies for
this purpose, but there are only a few instances in which that co-
opting is actually part of the core activity the employee is engaged to
perform.
The most obvious examples of jobs that are fundamentally about
co-opting the body for communicative and expressive purposes are
modeling and acting.  There might actually be ways for employers to
reasonably accommodate a model’s or actor’s dress choices.  For in-
stance, if a model is hired to be photographed in a dress, an employer
might accommodate her wish to keep her wedding ring on, as long as
the ring did not interfere with the image being presented.  Or, for
instance, an actor might wish his tattoo to show in a scene, and a di-
rector might refrain from covering the tattoo with makeup, as long as
the presence of a tattoo did not conflict with the character being por-
trayed.  However, because a core function of modeling and acting is to
have the body co-opted for the purpose of communicating and ex-
pressing on behalf of the employer, the fact that dress is generally a
subjective form of expression does not apply in these cases.  In the
case of models and actors, viewers will not understand their dress to
represent subjective choices on the part of the employee.  Thus, to
require reasonable accommodation in these instances would, in fact,
infringe on the expressive and imaginative rights of the employer.
The difficulty comes when employers claim that their employees
are actors or models, yet the employees appear to primarily serve a
large number of other functions.  For instance, Disney World de-
scribes its employees, many of whom operate rides, sell food and bev-
erages, and ensure safety, as “cast members.”228  The idea is that going
to Disney World is like going to a highly interactive play.  And indeed,
Disney World is distinguished from most other amusement parks in
this regard.  Everything from trash cans, to the color of sidewalks, to
the structures in which ride-goers stand in line, are coordinated in
Disney World to remind the park-goer of specific films, books, and
legends.
For a less plausible claim of this sort, the Borgata Hotel in Atlan-
tic City has claimed, as a means of justifying an extremely stringent
weight policy that forbids employees from ever gaining more than
seven percent of their body weight at the time of hire or adoption of
228. Disney Online, Casting at the Walt Disney World Resort, http://disney.go.com/Disney-
Careers/wdwcareers/overview.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
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the policy, that its cocktail waitresses and other beverage servers are
like cast members in a sexy fantasy that the hotel tries to create.229  If
these employees gain more than seven percent of their body weight,
they have only ninety days to lose it or be fired.230  Yet, despite at-
tempts to make the Borgata seem like a sexy fantasy-land, such as hav-
ing maid service tags in the rooms that say “Tidy Up/Tied Up,”231 the
casino has been reported as remaining largely indistinguishable from
other casinos: a place frequented by people in sweatshirts who want to
gamble and be served drinks, the vast majority of whom do not ogle
waitresses or care if they gain weight.232
I do not argue that either the statutory exemption for models and
actors or the undue hardship defense should be nearly as narrow as
defenses to disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination
under Title VII, such as the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) and business necessity defenses.233  Antidiscrimination laws
aim to shift social norms in a particular direction—away from racism,
sexism, and the like—and with good reason: a long history of discrimi-
nation.  The freedom of dress I propose for the workplace aims only
to soften the effects of capital on social norms.  Thus, if an employer
claimed undue hardship in response to an employee’s assertion of the
freedom of dress on the grounds that the co-optation of employee
bodies were part of the product being sold, this claim need not be
dismissed out of hand.  Of course, allowing bare assertions of cus-
tomer preference or the desire to control a corporate image to serve
as an undue hardship defense would swallow the reasonable accom-
modation rule altogether.234  But employers can show actual proof
229. See Gersh Kuntzman, Babes Up in Arms, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7047491/site/newsweek.
230. Stephanie Armour, Your Appearance, Good or Bad, Can Affect Size of Your Paycheck,
USA TODAY, July 20, 2005, at B1.
231. Kuntzman, supra note 229. R
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) (placing the burden of persuasion on the
employer to prove business necessity, and permitting plaintiffs to rebut that showing by
demonstrating that an alternative employment practice would also serve the business need
with less of an impact); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276–77 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating the rule that customer preference for one gender over another is not a BFOQ,
even in a case in which the customer preference at issue was that of foreign clients in
countries with different cultural mores than Americans); see also Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435–36 (1975) (rejecting an employer’s attempts to show that di-
ploma requirements and standardized tests served a business necessity).
234. As such, I disagree with the outcome and reasoning of Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., in which the court appears to hold that accommodation of any religion-based re-
quest to deviate from an employer’s dress code constitutes an undue hardship on the em-
ployer.  390 F.3d 126, 132–33 (1st Cir. 2004).
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that they target a niche market—such as Disney World, or perhaps a
restaurant like Hooters, or an interactive theme restaurant.  Such
proof can consist in market research to determine what customers are
willing to pay more money for, or what brings customers to an em-
ployer’s business.  (What customers are willing to pay money for is not
the same as, and may be much narrower than, what customers “pre-
fer.”)  This is exactly the type of evidence that Southwest Airlines once
sought to use to prove that its practice of hiring only female flight
attendants was justified by its branding as the “[L]ove [A]irline.”235
The data failed to be convincing to the judge in that case and, if any-
thing, showed that customers flew Southwest because the tickets were
cheap.236  But that would not be the case in every instance.
Courts would, of course, need to engage in factfinding when
presented with cases like Disney World, the Borgata Hotel, and sales-
people in clothing, jewelry, or makeup stores who could plausibly be
described as also being models.  But the need to draw these lines is
not unusual, and it’s been done before—in cases where employers
claimed that they were combining the business of providing air travel
with the business of sexually titillating customers in order to justify sex
discrimination in hiring flight attendants.237  Unlike the line-drawing
that would be involved in determining what kinds of dress constitute
African-American identity, gay male identity, or the like, this kind of
line-drawing would not involve the law in drawing essentialist conclu-
sions about race, gender, and similar categories.
Similarly, I do not argue that an undue hardship defense is so
narrow as to prevent the enforcement of anti-harassment policies in
the workplace against harassment that can be enacted through dress.
Indeed, in the context of reasonable accommodation claims based on
religion, courts have interpreted accommodations that would prevent
enforcement of policies against harassment of lesbian and gay employ-
ees to be either unreasonable or as constituting an undue hardship.238
I use the reasonable accommodation framework, with its undue hard-
ship defense, specifically to avoid the implication that the defense is as
narrow as a BFOQ or business necessity defense.
235. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294–95 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
236. Id. at 302–03.
237. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 387–88 (5th Cir. 1971)
(rejecting Pan Am’s use of sex as a hiring criterion for its flight attendants); Wilson, 517 F.
Supp. at 294–95 (rejecting Southwest’s argument that its customers’ preferences required
it to only hire female flight attendants).
238. See, e.g., Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606–07 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding that an employer had no duty to accommodate an employee’s efforts to post anti-
gay scripture because doing so would constitute an undue hardship).
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C. Returning to the Possibilities of Title VII: Reinvigorating the “Sex-plus”
and Disparate Impact Doctrines By Recognizing the Freedom of Dress
Understanding freedom of dress as a fundamental right, whether
by Congressional directive or judicial recognition, would also appro-
priately alter the analysis of certain challenges to personal appearance
restrictions raised under Title VII.  Understanding dress as a funda-
mental right would have important effects on both the “sex-plus” and
disparate impact categories of Title VII claims—effects that should
please those who care about dress as identity performance but are
wary of the essentializing effects of reading identity performances.
The sex-plus category of Title VII claims is based on the theory
that an employer has discriminated in violation of Title VII when em-
ployment decisions are made on the basis of sex, race, or another pro-
tected category “plus” an immutable trait or the exercise of a
fundamental right.239  So, for instance, while an employer would not
necessarily violate Title VII by firing employees who have children, an
employer would violate Title VII by firing only female employees who
have children, because having children is the exercise of a fundamen-
tal right.240  Employees have attempted to challenge sex-differentiated
appearance requirements under Title VII using the sex-plus claim,241
but they have generally lost on the grounds that grooming and dress
requirements do not involve either an immutable trait or the exercise
of a fundamental right.242  However, once freedom of dress is recog-
nized as a fundamental right, this ground for rejecting claims that sex-
differentiated grooming and appearance regulations violate Title VII
evaporates.
Disparate impact claims under Title VII have also been proposed
as a means of challenging certain facially neutral employer appear-
ance requirements, such as policies forbidding all employees from
wearing their hair in cornrows.243  Disparate impact claims notably do
not invoke the kind of essentialist danger that disparate treatment
239. E.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1088–89 & n.4 (5th Cir.
1975) (en banc).
240. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam) (re-
jecting company hiring policy that discriminated solely against women with pre-school-age
children).
241. See, e.g., Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1977) (al-
leging wrongful discharge after being terminated for failure to wear a tie during work
hours); Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1088–89 (involving a challenge to a publishing company’s
short hair policy for men).
242. See, e.g., Fountain, 555 F.2d at 756; Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091–92.
243. See Gonzalez, supra note 47, at 2196–97 (discussing the failure of courts to protect R
“ethnic traits”).
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claims of the same sort invoke, since they do not equate practices such
as wearing cornrows with racial identity, but rather, they simply ac-
knowledge the fact that such practices are engaged in at different
rates by various groups.244  The problem with bringing disparate im-
pact claims of this sort under Title VII is that these claims tend to have
no weight when the trait impacted by the regulation is not immutable,
because the employee is not seen as experiencing a truly adverse ef-
fect.245  Recognizing the freedom of dress as a fundamental right
would mitigate this problem because it would indicate why disparate
impact on dress represents real adversity to affected employees: Their
exercise of a fundamental right is impacted.
Roberto Gonzalez has recommended that scholars argue for the
“immutability” limitation on disparate impact claims to be relaxed as a
solution to the essentialist problems posed by recognizing identity
performance claims under Title VII.246  But while he solves the prob-
lem of essentialism, he does not find a solution to the “limitless” prob-
lem of identity performance claims.  If the requirement that disparate
impact claims reference an impacted immutable trait or fundamental
right evaporates, then the universe of disparate impact claims is ex-
tremely broad.  For instance, under Gonzalez’s proposal, if a litigant
proved that male employees were more likely to commit homophobic
harassment of coworkers, then the litigant would prevail when bring-
ing a sex-based disparate impact challenge to an employer’s tolerance
and anti-harassment policy.247  Gonzalez argues that the business ne-
cessity defense to disparate impact claims provides a proper limit to
disparate impact claims, but that defense is probably too narrow to
encompass something like an anti-gay-harassment policy in all but the
most progressive of American communities.  The problem with Gon-
zalez’s proposal, which is otherwise excellent, is that it doesn’t permit
employers to promote cultural values at all.  In contrast, my proposal
permits disparate impact claims to be brought with reference to re-
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that
bilingual employees did not make a prima facie case showing that their employer’s English-
only policy constituted discrimination under Title VII); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 272
(5th Cir. 1980) (upholding an employer’s English-only policy as not amounting to discrim-
ination based on national origin, as applied to employees fully capable of speaking English
but refusing to do so).
246. Gonzalez, supra note 47, at 2217, 2221–22. R
247. Cf. Bodett v. CoxCom, Inc., 366 F.3d 736, 740 (9th Cir. 2004) (terminated em-
ployee claimed religious discrimination arising from employer’s harassment policy that
protects lesbian and gay employees); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 601
(9th Cir. 2004) (same).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR102.txt unknown Seq: 59  5-DEC-06 12:18
2006] FREEDOM OF DRESS 69
strictions on dress, but not with reference to every kind of restriction
on employee choice imaginable.
V. FREEDOM OF DRESS ON THE STREET
A. The Compelling Interest Approach
As many challenges to state regulation of personal appearance as
there were in the 1970s, there have not been many published cases
challenging state attempts to regulate the freedom of dress in the pub-
lic square.  Perhaps this indicates that as deep as the culture war over
long-haired men was, most local political entities did not deign to tell
men they could not walk down the street with long hair.  As a result,
there have been few cases indicating what legal approach should be
taken to assess any attempts by the state to regulate the freedom of
dress on the street.
However, state regulation of the freedom of dress is not unheard
of even in the public square.  Centuries ago, sumptuary laws pre-
vented wearing dress that was not appropriate to one’s class so as to
enforce class divisions and prevent social mobility.248  For many years,
major cities in America criminalized cross-dressing.249  As late as 1976,
there were still laws prohibiting cross-dressing.250
While cross-dressing prohibitions and uses of public decency laws
to harass cross-dressers have mostly died,251 state regulation of dress is
far from unheard of even today.  In fact, in February 2005, the Vir-
ginia House passed a bill imposing a fine on anyone wearing pants low
enough to show their underwear.252  Virginia is not alone.  In May
2004, the Louisiana House considered a bill—on its fourth attempt—
to make wearing low-slung pants in public a crime carrying a $175 fine
and community service.253  Representative Derrick Shepherd, the
sponsor of the bill, complained about basketball-playing youth, stating
248. ANSPACH, supra note 5, at 261 (discussing fashion among the “elites”); LAUER & R
LAUER, supra note 123, at 56–57. R
249. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 338–41 (1999).
250. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 522 (Ill. 1978).  In this case, the
law was found unconstitutional as applied to two pre-operative transsexuals who cross-
dressed as part of their treatment, but notably, was not found unconstitutional on its face,
even though a liberty in personal appearance was recognized. Id. at 523.
251. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 249, at 111 (noting the rapid invalidation of cross-dressing R
ordinances in major cities).
252. H.D. 1981, 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2005).  After being mocked in a num-
ber of national newspapers, the Virginia Senate killed the bill.  Tara Bahrampour, A Brief
Matter of Style; Va. Senate Panel Bags Bill Outlawing Droopy Pants, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at
B1.
253. Bethany Thomas, Memo to Britney: Lose the Low-Slungs, MSNBC.COM, May 13, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4963512.
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that “[y]ou don’t have to shoot hoops with your pants below your
waist,” and that perhaps by “pull[ing] up their pants” the legislature
could also “lift their minds” as well.254  A town in Louisiana already
prohibits low-slung pants.255  Breaking the law carries a fine of $500
and up to six months in jail.256  And, in a nonscientific national poll
conducted by MSNBC adjoining an article covering the Louisiana bill,
a full thirty-two percent of the responders believed low-slung jeans
should be banned.257
In Hodge v. Lynd,258 a federal case decided in 2000, a young man
was arrested for wearing his baseball cap backwards at the county
fair.259  Police had determined in advance of the fair that wearing a
baseball cap backwards was associated with “gang activities,” and
therefore enforced a dress code that they thought would improve
safety and the feeling of safety at the fair.  The plaintiff ultimately pre-
vailed in his federal case challenging the arrest, but the judge deter-
mined that rational basis review is the proper standard of review for a
state regulation concerning how one wears one’s baseball cap at the
fair.260  The judge simply found that the dress code law in this case
was not reasonable.261
In Gatto v. County of Sonoma,262 a 2002 case out of California, a
man was expelled from fairgrounds for wearing a vest with motorcycle
gang insignia on it.263  The vagueness of the dress code at the fair was
its fatal flaw, but the court found that the operators of a county fair
could in fact ban clothing that they “reasonably believe might lead to
substantial disruption of or material interference with the event.”264
Because the operators had not in fact proscribed the wearing of a vest
with gang insignia, and had no reasonable belief that it would cause
disruption, the plaintiff prevailed.265
254. Id.
255. Id. (noting that wearing saggy pants in the town of Opelousas is considered a
misdemeanor).
256. Id.
257. Id. Twenty-five percent of responders felt the pants should not be banned, due to
freedom of expression concerns, and forty-two percent said they did not care because
there are more important things to worry about. Id.
258. 88 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D.N.M. 2000).
259. Id. at 1236–37.
260. Id. at 1242.
261. Id. at 1242–44.
262. 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
263. Id. at 553.
264. Id. at 576.
265. Id.
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In DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach,266 an Eleventh Circuit case from
1987, a man challenged Palm Beach’s ordinance prohibiting shirtless
running.  He succeeded in arguing that the ordinance violated free-
dom of personal appearance, but the Eleventh Circuit used rational
basis review, placing the burden on the runner to prove that the law
was unreasonable, and based its analysis heavily on the fact that it is
commonly considered acceptable to run shirtless and is therefore not
“offensive.”267
Finally, numerous cases have challenged public nudity laws.
Many of these cases involve adult entertainment establishments, and
are analyzed under First Amendment laws.  However, a fair number
involve nude sunbathers and other sorts of nudists.  These, too, are
generally analyzed as First Amendment cases, and the sunbathers usu-
ally lose, with courts citing a footnote to Erznoznik v. City of Jackson-
ville,268 in which the Supreme Court distinguished the legality of
prohibiting public nudity from the First Amendment issue in the
case—the legality of prohibiting a film with nudity from being shown
at a drive-in.269  Even where statutes only prohibit women from expos-
ing their breasts, but allow men to be topless, equal protection claims
of gender discrimination often fail.270
Thus, we must determine what the legal approach to freedom of
dress in public, “on the street,” should be.  For all the reasons out-
lined in Part III, public areas are an incredibly important locale for
exercise of the freedom of dress, since it is an activity that derives its
unique meaning from its simultaneously private and public role.
Moreover, a crucial element of the freedom of dress is the freedom to
create a personal identity for oneself that is individual and noncon-
formist, so as to challenge and contribute to cultural norms.271  Thus,
I argue that the proper approach to freedom of dress on the street (or
the beach) is not, as most courts have held, to see if there is a “reason-
able” state interest in regulating it and put the burden on the plaintiff
to prove that there is no such interest.  I argue that freedom of dress
266. 812 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1987).
267. Id. at 1366–67, 1369 & n.6.
268. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
269. Id. at 211 n.7.  For a public nudity case in which Erznoznik’s footnote 7 is cited, see
State v. Vogt, 775 A.2d 551, 557 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
270. See, e.g., Vogt, 775 A.2d at 557 (upholding an ordinance barring toplessness by wo-
men on the basis of “[p]rotecting the public sensibilities”). But see People v. David, 585
N.Y.S.2d 149, 151 (Monroe County Ct. 1991) (finding that a statute prohibiting women
from exposing their breasts in public violates the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and
New York State constitutions).
271. One is, of course, reminded of a similar aspect of freedom of speech—the impor-
tance of being free to state an unpopular idea.
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must be heavily protected on the street, with only the most compelling
of interests and narrowly drawn laws potentially justifying its
regulation.
In practice, most courts have, even under a nominally “reasona-
ble basis” standard of review, found regulations of dress such as limita-
tions on wearing a baseball cap backwards to be unconstitutional.
This “rational basis” standard nominally places the burden of proof
on plaintiffs, but appears to actually impose at least a burden of pro-
duction on the state.  However, when it comes to public nudity, plain-
tiffs tend to lose.
B. The Right to Nudity
Numerous courts have assessed public nudity challenges under
the rubric of the First Amendment.  In doing so, they have been re-
quired to assess whether the act of being nude expresses a particular-
ized idea, and how clearly communicative it is, in order to determine
how close it is to pure speech, which would receive heavy First Amend-
ment protection.272  They have generally found that public nudity,
apart from some other expressive communication, such as dancing,
does not express a particularized idea, and that being nude cannot be
an essential component of the communication.273
I do not object to this analysis of public nudity laws as applied to
businesses, such as strip clubs.  In these cases, the plaintiffs are the
businesses, not the dancers and models themselves, and under my the-
ory, businesses don’t have a freedom of dress because they are not
people.  Were the dancers and strippers the litigants in these cases,
then the freedom of dress would be implicated.  However, analyzing
public nudity of persons arrested on the street or at the beach only
under the First Amendment represents a failure to recognize the in-
trusion of those laws on the freedom of dress.
272. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (plurality opinion)
(finding that nude dancing is expressive conduct under the First Amendment, but “only
marginally so”); Hang On, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 65 F.3d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir. 1995) (“It
is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person under-
takes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the
First Amendment.” (quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)) (alteration
in original)); S. Fla. Free Beaches, Inc. v. City of Miami, 734 F.2d 608, 610 (11th Cir. 1984)
(“[N]udity is protected as speech only when combined with some mode of expression
which itself is entitled to first amendment protection.” (quoting Chapin v. Town of South-
ampton, 457 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (E.D.N.Y. 1978))); Vogt, 775 A.2d at 557 (stating that
nude sunbathing does not implicate the First Amendment).
273. E.g., S. Fla. Free Beaches, 734 F.2d at 610 (finding that nudity is not an inherently
expressive state).
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When it comes to freedom of dress, it matters little that the ex-
pression is not specific, particular, or necessarily political, because
freedom of dress is not important only as an adjunct to speech.  Thus,
how similar it is to speech should be irrelevant.  What matters in as-
sessing whether an act is a core exercise of the freedom of dress is
whether it represents an individual’s decision with respect to how he
or she is defined in relation to the rest of society—whether it empha-
sizes, reconfirms, or revises parts of his or her identity and personality.
Some have argued that the freedom of personal appearance does not
include the freedom to be entirely naked.274 The theory that I provide
in Part III for why freedom of dress is important, however, makes clear
that being naked can be an exercise of the freedom of dress because it
represents a choice about the relevance of one’s exposed body to so-
cial interaction.  My search of the case law, nevertheless, turned up no
cases in which a litigant successfully challenged a public nudity statute
on the grounds that it violated his or her right to determine personal
appearance.275  In this Section, I assess whether there really are state
interests sufficient to justify banning individuals’ choices to be nude in
public.
One possible state interest is the interest in protecting non-nudist
citizens from being offended and acting disruptively.  However, the
nature of the freedom of dress is that it encompasses the choice to
dress (or not dress) in a way that others will dislike, in order to enact a
nonconformist identity, as well as to challenge the current code of
meanings for dress choices.  To restrict the freedom of dress merely
because it offends public sensibilities is for the state to choose sides in
a cultural war over the appropriate way for individuals to present
themselves in public.
Another possible state interest is to protect citizens from threat-
ening sexual behavior.  Public masturbation and other “indecent acts”
274. People v. Craft, 509 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1011–12 (Rochester City Ct. 1986) (finding
nudity not to be within any Ninth Amendment rights to personal appearance).
275. In Williams v. Kleppe, the First Circuit rejected a challenge to the ban on nudity at
the beach, because the right of personal appearance implicated only rational basis review,
and the federal government’s desire to environmentally protect the beach was a legitimate
interest justifying the ban, even in the face of failure to simply limit access to a small or
nonexistent number of persons.  539 F.2d 803, 806–07 (1st Cir. 1976).  Other cases that
come close, but also do not secure public nudity rights based on personal appearance,
include DeWeese v. Town of Palm Beach, in which a litigant prevailed in challenging a statute
prohibiting shirtless running under this theory, but the litigant was male and the statute
was not a public nudity statute.  812 F.2d 1365, 1365, 1369 (11th Cir. 1987).  Another case
is People v. David, where female litigants in New York prevailed on equal protection
grounds when the law forbade women but permitted men to go topless.  585 N.Y.S.2d at
151.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR102.txt unknown Seq: 64  5-DEC-06 12:18
74 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:11
may be deemed threatening because they might warn of an impend-
ing sexual assault to the observer.  While I am not sure whether this
fear is accurate, a law that prohibits public nudity in the form of sun-
bathing and walking down the street naked is neither drawn nor en-
forced narrowly to address the problem of “indecent acts” as sexual
threats.  A law drawn to more accurately target that problem should
include mens rea elements such as intent, knowledge, or at a mini-
mum, recklessness.  Indeed, some jurisdictions are careful to limit the
crime of indecent exposure in this way.276
If the freedom of dress is understood as a unique right, rather
than as within the penumbra of “pure speech,” public nudity on the
part of individuals on the street or at the beach is at the core of that
right.  Thus, statutes applied to prohibit that behavior, in the absence
of some showing of threat or harassment, should not survive.  One
could argue from a legal realist perspective that theorizing dress sepa-
rately from speech would, in practice, do little to change the law of
public nudity.  On this theory, the frequent failure of First Amend-
ment challenges brought by those found to violate public nudity laws
stems largely from judges’ affinity for Victorian sexual repression.
Thus, even if nudity were understood to be at the core of freedom of
dress, judges would, in individual cases, find defendants to have requi-
site criminal intent to cause fear of sexual assault in others.  While
that might well be the case, on the margins, I do believe that under-
standing nudity to be a core exercise of a fundamental right, rather
than an act of symbolic speech existing on the periphery of the First
Amendment, would make some difference.  Although obscenity laws
remain constitutional under prevailing First Amendment doctrine,
they are certainly more narrowly constrained than they would be in
the absence of our continual affirmation of and belief in the impor-
tance of free speech.277
276. See, e.g., In re Dallas W., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
[A] person does not expose his private parts “lewdly” within the meaning of sec-
tion 314 unless his conduct is sexually motivated.  Accordingly, a conviction of
that offense requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor not only
meant to expose himself, but intended by his conduct to direct public attention
to his genitals for purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or affront.
Id. at 494 (quoting In re Smith, 497 P.2d 807, 810 (Cal. 1972)).
277. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (reaffirming that obscene
materials are not protected by the First Amendment).
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C. Threatening Dress and Safety Regulations: This Gun is Part of
My Outfit
In the interest of carefully defining the borders of the freedom of
dress in public, I address the hypothetical in which an element of a
person’s dress might actually raise a safety concern.  Many Sikh wor-
shippers subscribe to a tenet that requires the carrying of a kirpan, a
ceremonial knife.278  Others might also claim that a gun or other
weapon is part of personal appearance, apart from religious tenets.
Under my theory, protecting the safety of citizens is in fact a com-
pelling interest that legitimates restrictions on the freedom of dress
and would, in general, justify concealed weapons laws that do impinge
upon the freedom of dress, as long as they are drawn narrowly.  More-
over, if an item of dress is concealed from public view, this radically
diminishes the strength of the interest in freedom of dress under my
theory of the freedom.  However, because the freedom of dress does
not prevent other constitutional claims from being brought, my the-
ory of the freedom of dress doesn’t answer whether freedom of relig-
ious exercise should require reasonable accommodation where
possible for Sikhs and other religious believers.279  However, it does
imply that challenges to such laws would generally fail when articu-
lated as assertions of the freedom of dress.
D. Licensing and Age of Consent Regulations on Tattoo Artists and Body
Modifiers
Another important arena in which the freedom of dress is regu-
lated, although not directly, is licensing regulations that apply to tat-
tooing and body modification as well as hair salons.  Health and safety
regulation is generally considered a compelling government inter-
est,280 and the intrusion on freedom of dress that such laws cause
doesn’t strike at the core of the freedom of dress.  Such laws do limit
278. See, e.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing three
Khalsa Sikh children in a public school system for whom the wearing of a kirpan was a
fundamental tenet of their faith).
279. See id. at 885 & n.3 (identifying public schools that had found ways to accommodate
the wearing of kirpans without compromising student safety, such as dulling the knives and
securely riveting them to their sheaths).
280. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
On various occasions we have accepted the proposition that “States have a com-
pelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and . . . as
part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests
they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and regu-
lating the practice of professions.”
Id. at 625 (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
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access to tattooing, piercing, and hairstyling, but minimally so, espe-
cially in light of the state’s interest in preventing the spread of hepati-
tis, HIV, and other blood-borne diseases.  The law permits states to
engage in such licensing even where a fundamental interest is impli-
cated.  For instance, in the case of abortion, such laws are scrutinized
using the “undue burden” standard.281
Such a relaxed standard makes a great deal more sense for scruti-
nizing the licensing of tattoo and piercing providers than the licens-
ing of abortion providers because the need for particularly speedy
access, high levels of privacy, and a documented regional lack of prov-
iders282 are absent in the case of tattooing and piercing.  However,
there are states that have gone much further than simply licensing
tattoo and piercing artists.  Until recently, South Carolina banned tat-
tooing altogether, except as performed by a physician for cosmetic or
reconstructive purposes.283  Massachusetts has a similar ban as well.284
In 2002, the Supreme Court of South Carolina upheld this ban against
a First Amendment challenge from a man who was prosecuted after
being shown on the news tattooing another person, and the Supreme
Court of the United States denied certiorari.285  Many states forbid
children from obtaining tattoos, or forbid tattooing by anyone but a
physician.286
Because these regulations forbid all persons or an entire class of
persons from exercising their freedom of dress to obtain tattoos, I ar-
gue that they must be scrutinized closely as laws that strike at the core
of the freedom of dress, not merely as health regulations.  In State v.
White, South Carolina failed to grant tattooing any sort of protection
because it was analyzed as implicating only speech interests, and was
281. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1313 (Souter, Circuit Justice
1994).
282. See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services In the
United States in 2000, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 10 (2003) (finding that in
2000, 87% of counties in the United States had no abortion provider, and that 34% of
women lived in such a county).
283. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-700 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005) (amending § 16-17-700 to
allow licensed tattoo artists and physicians’ employees to perform tattooing procedures);
see also State v. White, 560 S.E.2d 420, 421 (S.C. 2002) (citing § 16-17-700 of the South
Carolina Code).
284. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 34 (West 2000).
285. White, 560 S.E.2d at 421, 424, cert. denied, White v. South Carolina, 537 U.S. 825
(2002).
286. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Tattooing and Body Piercing, http://
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/bodyart-1.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2006) (collecting state
tattoo and body piercing regulations and noting that, as of January 2006, over twenty-nine
states restrict or prohibit adolescents from getting tattoos or body piercings).
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found to not communicate particularized messages.287  Properly rec-
ognizing the freedom of dress as a unique right means that total bans
on practices like tattooing and body piercing, given the availability of
health regulations to address safety and public health concerns,
should be understood as illegitimately infringing that right.288
Bans on the tattooing of minors of course present a more compli-
cated problem.  In general, the state is permitted to exercise parental-
ism toward children.289  However, parentalism toward children is
highly problematic with respect to freedom of dress because the exer-
cise of freedom of dress is crucial as a child, given its special role in
the development of social identity for children.  Other forms of iden-
tity performance and exploration are often less available for children
than they even are for adults, such as choices with respect to work,
sexual practice, or where to live.  Because freedom of dress plays such
a crucial role in helping the human being develop a public personal-
ity, and because adolescence is such an important time in that devel-
opmental process, we should be wary of allowing the state to exercise
its usual parentalist role toward children.
However, certain forms of body modification are rather long-
lasting and, as a result, the experimentation that is normally associ-
ated with adolescent freedom of dress is fraught with permanence
when it comes to tattooing, as well as body modifications more perma-
nent than simple piercings.  Moreover, the long-term consequences of
not receiving a body modification like a tattoo until adulthood are not
nearly as significant as the consequences of banning the exercise of a
right such as the right to abortion until adulthood.  Nevertheless,
there are consequences to not getting a permanent body modifica-
tion.  The permanent nature of many body modifications can make
the time at which they are obtained a significant element of meaning.
Tattoos serve as reminders of events that inspired them, and of the
287. White, 560 S.E.2d at 423–24.
288. What about practices that cause death or grave bodily injury, severely disable, or
carry a high risk of death or disability accompanying the procedure?  Cosmetic amputation
or infliction of gunshot wounds come to mind.  Resolving at what point state paternalism is
justified to criminalize or heavily regulate a practice, due to the risks of death and disabil-
ity, is always a difficult one.  I do not believe that allowing the state to engage in some
paternalism, in extreme cases, undermines the case for setting the bar of justification for
that paternalism quite high.
289. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (plurality
opinion) (upholding a parental consent requirement for minors seeking abortions on the
“assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents and that children
will often not realize that their parents have their best interests at heart,” while striking
down a spousal notification provision because the Court could not “adopt a parallel as-
sumption about adult women”).
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person the wearer was when he or she got the tattoo.  Asking children
to delay items like tattoos until adulthood can interfere with such per-
sonal, private aspects of freedom of dress.
As a result, acknowledging the particular importance of freedom
of dress for children implies that a complete ban on the tattooing of
minors goes too far.  Concerns associated with the permanence of the
choice could be more narrowly addressed by requiring parental notifi-
cation and cooling-off periods for minors.
VI. FREEDOM OF DRESS IN SCHOOLS
In the United States, we’ve long recognized that students in pub-
lic schools retain some of their basic rights.290  However, because pub-
lic schools serve the function of educating children, they may
generally regulate the exercise of these rights more than the govern-
ment could directly.291  In this Part, I will argue that public school
restrictions on student freedom of dress should be subjected to high
levels of scrutiny. Interests such as preserving children’s safety or
health are legitimate to justify narrow restrictions on freedom of
dress, but interests such as avoiding “distractions,” promoting school
spirit, or generally improving “discipline” will not be legitimate under
my theory of freedom of dress, without some showing of disruption
that rises to the level of interfering with educational functions.  My
earlier extended engagement with the unique reasons why freedom of
dress is important, in its own right, helps to demonstrate why giving
dress second-class status as a nonfundamental liberty interest is unwise
in the school context.  Rather, the arguments for protecting student
dress may be even more compelling than the arguments for protect-
ing students’ “pure speech,” often considered one of the most funda-
mental of all American liberties.
Then, I examine the cases of banning gang-related attire and ex-
pensive and fashionable items in an attempt to promote student
safety.  I look at the appropriateness of school administrator responses
to these problems that more broadly restrict the freedom of dress,
such as bans on all hats.
290. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(“Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution.  They
are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they themselves
must respect their obligations to the State.”).
291. E.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (“A school need
not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even
though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Next, I look at attempts to restrict items like headscarves for girls
in schools, these attempts being grounded on the notion that the re-
strictions actually promote freedom of dress by interfering in the pri-
vate control of children’s dress exercised in communities outside of
school.  Finally, I look at the use of uniforms in public school, on the
grounds that school uniforms will operate as a class equalization mea-
sure, preventing the class awareness that comes when wealthier stu-
dents are permitted to spend a great deal of money on their personal
appearance.
A. The Socialization of Children
In recent years, federal courts appear to have embraced a theory
of public education as a place where children are socially integrated
into a single, unitary public community.292  Thus, repressing differ-
ence and inducing conformity are essential components of this educa-
tional function, and often serve to overcome student assertions of
individual rights.293  It is true that one of the functions of public
school is to socialize children, and that even within a pluralistic soci-
ety, part of that socialization may involve the promotion of certain
universal values.294  Yet, an understanding of this socialization process
as one that is in direct conflict with student liberty is not only unwise,
it does not make sense for a pluralistic society such as America.  In
other words, student liberty and successful socialization are not per-
fectly inversely related.  Two facts complicate the notion of an inverse
relationship between the two: first, respect for others’ liberty is one of
the norms public schools attempt to promulgate, and second, in a
world where exit altogether from the public school system is an op-
tion, preservation of some student liberty may avoid inducing that
exit, and the resulting isolation and marginalization such exit would
entail.
First, as many commentators have noted, and as the Supreme
Court referenced in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
292. See Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?  Keeping Order in
the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 64–70, 86, 93 (1996) (discussing the Court’s
opinions dealing with school power and contrasting two models of public education—the
social reconstruction model, in which students are empowered to reconstruct society cul-
turally, and the social reproduction model, in which schools reproduce society’s current
cultural values by inculcating children).
293. See Miller, supra note 7, at 637–38 (outlining the trend in Supreme Court cases R
post-Tinker to reject student rights challenges to school policies and decisions).
294. See, e.g., Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 2005)
(rejecting a challenge by parents to a survey on sex administered to students by a public
elementary school psychologist), amended by 447 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
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District,295 among the most important of social norms schools must
teach children are norms of tolerance, respecting the liberty of others,
and the value of public debate and confrontation.296  Thus, schools
must teach children not to conform unquestioningly, not to respect
authority mindlessly, and not to make political and social gains simply
by silencing, suppressing, or exiling difference.  If school administra-
tors do not model these norms to some degree, by permitting and
respecting conflict and dissent in certain areas, these important
norms will be less successfully imparted.
Second, our rights to privacy mean that the more public schools
promote norms by coercing those who disagree with them, the greater
the chance they will induce retreat into the private sphere.  Leaders
and parents in subcultures that clash with school administrator norms
can remove children from public schools and place them in private
schools, or even remove children from school altogether.297  This re-
treat into the private sphere simply isolates, and can even economi-
cally marginalize, the very children that are claimed to be in need of
socialization.  This phenomenon has been described by those writing
about controversies surrounding headscarf bans in France and Tur-
key.298  In America, rights of privacy and rights of parents to control
the upbringing of their children are considered fundamental rights
that are accorded great deference.299  Thus, when the values of those
295. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
296. Id. at 511–13.
297. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–36 (1972) (holding that the Free Exercise
Clause protected the rights of Amish parents to remove their children from school alto-
gether after eighth grade, even in the face of the state interest in universal compulsory
education); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding unconstitu-
tional an Oregon law compelling attendance at public school).
298. See, e.g., Maximilien Turner, Comment, The Price of a Scarf: The Economics of Strict
Secularism, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON. L. 321, 336–43 (2005).  Turner cites evidence that
“[f]or thousands of women [in Turkey], headscarf prohibitions require abandoning hopes
for joining professional-class careers in medicine, science or education.” Id. at 336–37.  He
also describes how
[a]nother serious effect of the headscarf ban, particularly in rural areas, may
be that many families will simply choose not to send their daughters to school at
all.  In one case study, a Turkish woman recalls that her family never wanted her
to go to primary school; she had to struggle to get their permission at each step of
her educational advancement.
Id. at 337–38.  Turner also describes how a 1997 expulsion of twenty girls in Lille, France
from school for wearing  headscarves led to “their parents open[ing] the country’s first
private Muslim school, although they faced significant administrative hurdles and scru-
tiny.” Id. at 340.  He also demonstrates that foreign religious entities “have shown them-
selves willing to finance Islamic education in both France and Turkey.” Id. at 343.
299. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213–14, 232–35 (discussing parents’ rights to control the up-
bringing of their children); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35 (same).
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who dominate a subculture are afforded no place at all in public
schools, parents may be incentivized to remove their children from
public school and place them in private school, home school their
children,300 or even stop their education altogether, as early as that is
legally permitted.301 Religious and other subcultural leaders may be
incentivized to create private schools that cater to subcultural tastes.
For instance, children in marginalized and isolated polygamous com-
munities in America may learn racial hatred from church leaders.302
Even where children do not exit the public school system as a result of
infringements on their liberty, too much coercion leads to resentment
and resistance.303  In general, regimes in which persons are given a
choice between their subculture and participation in public life fail to
respect the fact that many persons want both, and that by having both,
individuals can be empowered to further democratic norms and
norms of tolerance, legality, and nonviolence within subculture, as
well as to exit subcultures or exercise real choice to stay within
them.304
In sum, while socialization is indeed a crucial function of public
school, to characterize socialization as in direct conflict with student
liberty is far too simplistic.  Schools need to respect and accommodate
some exercises of student liberty within school, not only to comply with
constitutional or human rights constraints, but also to fulfill the social-
ization function itself.  How then, does freedom of dress fit into this
more complicated picture?
300. See David Crary, Evangelicals Lead Push for Home Schooling, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 3,
2006, available at http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/nation/15432797.htm (describing
the immense political passion of the home-schooling community and its relationship with
the religious right wing); see also Bradley P. Jacob, Free Exercise in the “Lobbying Nineties,” 84
NEB. L. REV. 795,  827 & n.134 (2006) (same).
301. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210–12 (discussing the Amish community’s objection to
formal education beyond the eighth grade).
302. See, e.g., David Kelly, Lost to the Only Life They Knew, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2005, at A1
(reporting on life in the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
(FLDS), including accounts of formal education in racism from “Lost Boys,” male children
exiled from their church and community); see also Southern Poverty Law Center, In His
Own Words (2005), http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?sid=342 (quot-
ing the radical teachings of Warren Jeffs, the recently apprehended FLDS “prophet”).
303. See Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and
Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 50–51 (2005) (describing how the headscarf, once a
symbol of subservience, has become “a symbol of distinction and prestige for urban Muslim
women,” and a form of rebellion against their parents, in the wake of the French govern-
ment’s prohibition of headscarves in public schools (quoting Nilu¨fer Go¨le, The Voluntary
Adoption of Islamic Stigma Symbols, 70 SOC. RES. 809, 821 (2003))).
304. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1404–08 (2003) (discussing
individuals’ rejection of a binary system that forces them to choose between, rather than
reconcile, life in the public sphere versus the private religious sphere).
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Four features of freedom of dress make it an excellent area in
which to provide students with the kind of liberty that allows for dem-
ocratic, rather than coercive, socialization.  First, exercises of the free-
dom of dress play a special role in forming and re-forming individual
and community-based identity, especially for those who are not yet
adults, as I described in Part III.  Dress is an extremely common site of
identity performance and identity seeking behavior both for larger
groups with more social power, such as major religions and racial
groups,305 as well as smaller subcultures that may have little demo-
cratic power, such as sexual minorities, members of less common reli-
gions, and many youth movements and groups.306
Second, given its subjective rather than objective nature, as I’ve
described in Part III.E, student exercises of the freedom of dress are
not easily confused with school-sponsored speech.  The idea that
schools must avoid the misattribution of messages communicated by
students to the schools themselves has been a prominent factor in the
two major Supreme Court cases to uphold restrictions on student
speech in public schools—Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser307 and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.308  In these two cases, punish-
ment for a sexually suggestive student council nomination speech,309
as well as censorship of a student newspaper article concerning teen
pregnancy and sexuality,310 were both upheld because of the school’s
interest in controlling its own speech.311  Both the nomination speech
and the newspaper article were deemed confusable with school-spon-
sored views.  These cases have been viewed as chipping away at student
rights to free speech articulated in Tinker, in which a student’s right to
wear a black armband to protest the Vietnam War was upheld against
school attempts to forbid the armband.312  While Fraser and Hazelwood
have been understood as implicitly overturning Tinker,313 or as repre-
senting narrow exceptions to Tinker that uphold school prerogatives
305. For instance, some Christian people wear necklaces with a cross, some Muslim peo-
ple wear a hijab, and some Jewish people wear a yarmulke.
306. For instance, some gay men and lesbians wear pink and black triangles, respec-
tively, Kim Ode, Gay Pride’s Rainbow Flag No Cause for Alarm, STAR TRIB., Jan. 23, 2001, at 2E,
and some punks obtain tattoos, TattooJohnny.com, Punk Tattoos and Tattoo Design
Guide, http://www.tattoojohnny.com/punk-tattoo-designs.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
307. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
308. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
309. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685–86.
310. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 270–71.
311. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685–86; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272–73.
312. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504, 514 (1969).
313. E.g., Chemerinksy, supra note 7, at 541–42 (noting the Court’s changing approach R
to student expression following Tinker).
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to ban lewd speech or regulate student newspapers,314 we could also
distinguish Tinker because it involved the freedom of dress, and thus
claims that the student expression at issue in that case were con-
fusable with school sponsored or school administrator speech would
have been quite implausible.315
Third, the overlap, and therefore the conflict, between student
dress and the most essential aspects of pedagogy and socialization in
public schools is actually quite minimal.  Typical pedagogical and so-
cialization goals in school are promoting a work ethic, teaching stu-
dents how to compromise, teaching students how to engage in
respectful disagreement, and of course, teaching subjects like English,
Math, Art, and History.  The kind of pedagogical goals a “charm
school” might have are not typical of a public school.  Thus, in con-
trast to verbal speech, dress intersects with core pedagogical functions
relatively rarely.  For instance, respecting cultural difference in the
form of nonstandard English problematically intersects with the peda-
gogical functions of teaching reading, writing, and speaking.  In order
to learn standard spelling and grammar, most students need to prac-
tice using that standard grammar and spelling on a daily basis, even
when they write essays in Biology class, for instance.  Learning the skill
is not easily compartmentalized.
Similarly, any rights of parents to shelter their children from cer-
tain concepts, such as sexuality and evolution, conflict quite sharply
with traditional tools of pedagogy—the provision of information se-
lected by teachers, the asking of questions selected by teachers, and
the promotion of discussion between students that is supervised and
directed by teachers.  Thus, accommodating a religious student’s re-
quest that the equality of men and women not be taught in school, or
even that she be excused from that day’s lesson, conflicts sharply with
the pedagogical function of teaching American history, as well as the
socialization function of promoting sex equality.  On the other hand,
accommodating that same student’s request to wear religious garb
does not prevent the equality of men and women from being taught
in school, even if school administrators are confident that her dress
symbolizes inequality of men and women.  Teachers could even teach
that a type of religious garb promotes inequality while letting a stu-
314. E.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 649–50, 673–74. R
315. Of course, the Tinker Court made clear that it was not giving the armband protec-
tion because of its status as an exercise of the right to personal appearance, but rather due
to its equivalence with political speech.  But surely the fact that the armband was tied
around individual students’ bodies helped negate any concern that the students’ anti-war
opinions could be imputed to the school.
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dent wear it.  Of course, such a lesson would represent a deep chal-
lenge to the student’s beliefs, but this is precisely the sort of challenge
the school might wish to make.  Similarly, in order to learn that wear-
ing a tongue pierce to a job interview can harm one’s chances of get-
ting the job, one merely needs to be told this fact or perhaps tested on
it.  Few students would need to practice not wearing a tongue pierce
to school every day in order to understand.
One might argue that regulating dress does intersect with the
pedagogical function of preparing children for the work world, and
that strict dress codes and uniforms are part of that preparation.  Be-
ing forbidden from wearing a tongue pierce to school does of course
reinforce the lesson that the pierce may be disliked by members of the
community, but the benefits of this reinforcement are clearly margi-
nal when compared to the reinforcement benefits that come with
daily practice of the skills involved in solving math problems, learning
a language, developing exercise habits, creating art, performing and
composing music, engaging in polite debate, or critically thinking.316
It is only when the study of dress is understood as the study of a
rote, habitual skill that enforcing dress codes and uniforms on chil-
dren makes a great deal of pedagogical sense.  There is, indeed, a
trend toward teaching many subjects as rote or “vocational” skills in
public schools, especially schools that are plagued with other
problems.317  Struggling schools sometimes require students to take
vocational courses that train them to be robotic, but skilled, workers,
rather than focusing on more academic study, whether that study is
basic (literacy) or high level (literary criticism).318  Some administra-
tors view this as the best they can do for poor children, or worse, the
best they can do for a society that seeks not personal and social fulfill-
ment for the children themselves, but rather the use of their labor.319
I oppose this trend and therefore do not find this vocationalized un-
derstanding of dress a compelling enough pedagogical concern to
override the social development and identity formation/reformation
316. Of course, personal appearance can be studied on a higher and more serious level,
and at this level of study, the benefits of daily practice using one’s own body are clearer.
But at this level of study, where fashion, makeup, hairstyling, and body art are deemed
objects of deeper academic study, enforcing uniformity or making some forms of dress off-
limits seems only to inhibit the pedagogical goal, which includes creativity and innovation.
317. See JONATHAN KOZOL, THE SHAME OF THE NATION: THE RESTORATION OF APARTHEID
SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 89–96 (2005) (discussing the work-oriented nature of the curricu-
lum at some public schools).
318. See id. at 102–03 (describing the culinary arts vocational and job-training focus in
one public school).
319. Id. at 104–07 (noting that some business leaders advocate “school-to-work” for their
own benefit).
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functions that exercise of the freedom of dress serves for children.
This is especially the case where schools have the option of providing
children with information about personal appearance, and even test-
ing them on their understanding of that information.
Fourth, and finally, “hands off student bodies” is already part of
many public school approaches to teaching and socialization.  Al-
though corporal punishment does still occur in public schools, it is
uncommon and in decline.320  More than half of all states ban the
practice, and many students in the other states live in school districts
where the practice is banned.321  Strip searches also appear to be rela-
tively uncommon.322  Respecting the freedom of dress requires little
extension of this principle of respect for the independence of the stu-
dent’s physical being.
In sum, in order that public schools may fulfill their socialization
functions most effectively, some student liberty should be maintained
within schools.  For the above reasons, freedom of dress is an ideal
area of liberty for public schools to respect.  In the case of political or
artistic speech, it is easy (for some) to live with restrictions on chil-
dren, especially young children, because we know that they will be
able to fully exercise these rights and participate in public life once
they exit school as adults.  In the case of abortion, it is impossible to
live with such restrictions, given the irreversible effects of a woman’s
decision to have or not have an abortion, no matter what her age.
Exercise of the right of freedom of dress falls between these two ex-
tremes, and in general, it cannot wait until adulthood.  As explained
in Part III, freedom of dress is especially important to children be-
cause it is part of developing a sense of private and public identity,
and it is during adolescence that the use of personal appearance in
that process is highest for many people.
Of course, dress, like any other behavior, might be manipulated
to violate school rules that do not target dress, such as rules against
making threats or harassing other students—an issue I will deal with
320. See National Association of School Psychologists, Position Statement on Corporal Pun-
ishment in Schools, July 21, 2001, http://www.nasponline.org/information/pos-
paper_corppunish.html; The Center for Effective Discipline, U.S. Statistics on Corporal
Punishment by State and Race, http://www.stophitting.com/disatschool/statesBan-
ning.php (last visited Aug. 29, 2006) (showing a long-term downward trend in students
struck in public schools).
321. National Association of School Psychologists, supra note 320; The Center for Effec- R
tive Discipline, supra note 320. R
322. See Scott A. Gartner, Strip Searches of Students: What Johnny Really Learned at School and
How Local School Boards Can Help Solve the Problem, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 923 (1997) (find-
ing approximately one dozen instances of strip searches reported in national newspapers
between 1990 and 1997).
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in the next Section on gang dress in schools.  When this occurs,
schools cannot ignore it, just as schools cannot ignore other forms of
threats and harassment, even in the face of the First Amendment.  But
assuming schools can punish threats, harassment, and the like when
they happen to be enacted through dress, just as they would punish
such behavior when enacted through speech or physical actions and
violence, schools can still generally allow students to exercise their
freedom of dress in public school.  Doing so promotes, rather than
undermines, a pluralistic culture in which the value of both individu-
als and community are explored and respected, and in which students
can explore their own identities through manipulation of their own
appearance and body.
B. Disruptions and Safety: Gang Dress
Some states have promulgated laws permitting school districts to
impose mandatory school uniforms on students or stringent dress
codes in an explicit effort to deal with the problems associated with
gang violence and culture.323  Some gangs use dress, including tat-
toos, to express gang affiliation.  Affiliation may be expressed in a
range of ways, from wearing a particular color of clothing, to tucking a
pen behind either a left or right ear.324  Thus, it is unsurprising that
extremely stringent dress codes or mandatory uniforms have been
used in an attempt to suppress the violence and intimidation that are
associated with gangs.
In general, protecting the students who attend public school
from violence, harassment, and threats would be, in my view, a com-
pelling enough interest to overcome many assertions of student lib-
erty, including the freedom of dress.  However, as I’ve argued above, a
proper understanding of the unique aspects of freedom of dress helps
demonstrate why it should be valued highly within public schools,
rather than given a low value as an adjunct to freedom of speech.
Thus, an argument often launched in favor of upholding regulations
of student dress in public school—that other avenues for traditional
communication remain—treats dress merely as an adjunct to speech,
and therefore fails to appreciate the unique qualities of dress that
make it even more compelling of a liberty to protect within schools
than speech.
323. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West 1993 & Supp. 2006).
324. See Ann Kordas, Note, Losing My Religion: Controlling Gang Violence Through Limita-
tions on Freedom of Expression, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1451, 1455–56 (2000) (noting several fashion
styles that have been targeted by schools as indicative of gang membership).
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Given that dress should be given a wide berth in public schools,
targeting dress directly, rather than enforcing school rules against the
making of threats, violence, and the like, is unwarranted even in the
case of alleged gang disruption of school.  Of course, enforcing such
rules takes work, and even money, but then, respecting any student
liberty will impose some costs, and as I’ve argued above, public
schools should respect some area of student liberty.  If a student has
used his or her dress to spark a violent conflict with other students,
that student can be punished without resorting to regulations of dress.
Or, if a student is shown to have used dress to break school rules in
the past, that particular student can even be forbidden from wearing
similar dress to school in the future.  Suppose, for instance, that in a
racially homogenous community, one African-American student at-
tended an otherwise all white school.  Then suppose that one of this
student’s classmates was embroiled in an ongoing battle with the
African-American student.  Then suppose that student wore a Confed-
erate flag t-shirt to school to express that he planned on attacking the
other student, or to racially harass him.  School administrators could
punish that student for threats and harassment.  Administrators might
even be required to do something about certain forms of harassment
under Title IX. The white student might claim that he was not, in fact,
threatening and harassing anyone, but this question of fact could be
resolved one way or another.  T-shirts can, of course, be harassing and
threatening, but a rule that treats such t-shirts as harassing and threat-
ening in every instance is not only factually implausible—consider a
student who is wearing the t-shirt as part of a Halloween costume, or a
play—it uses the bodies of students to teach the lesson that Confeder-
ate flags inherit a history of racism and violence.
Students can be discouraged from joining gangs, displaying con-
federate flags, and otherwise doing things that are considered antiso-
cial in many ways, but forbidding them from wearing these clothes or
forcing them to wear uniforms is one of the most invasive methods we
could imagine.  Protecting teenagers from sexually transmitted dis-
eases and unwanted pregnancy is a concern we might find just as im-
portant as protecting them from gang intimidation.  But would we
respond to this concern by requiring all students to wear shirts to
school that say “I believe in safe sex”?  Or if students had developed a
code in which red meant “Not a Virgin,” would we forbid students
from wearing red?  The better response to the problem is to teach a
sex education course.
When dress is analyzed as an important right to preserve for stu-
dents in schools, mandatory school uniforms and dress codes as solu-
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tions to the spread of gangs would usually be seen as extremely
overbroad mechanisms for accomplishing the very legitimate and
compelling goals of discouraging gang membership and stopping in-
timidation.  Such mechanisms are not narrowly tailored in the
slightest.
C. Headscarf Bans: Restricting the Freedom of Dress or Promoting It?
Many countries have attempted to justify bans on the wearing of
headscarves as supportive of student rights, rather than infringing on
student rights.  France, for instance, has justified such bans as promot-
ing the rights of Muslim girls who might otherwise be coerced into
wearing headscarves by parents and fundamentalist religious leaders.
By providing a space at school where girls can decide to be secular,
decide that they feel headscarves are not appropriate, or decide to be
religious without subscribing to the admonition that a headscarf be
worn, government actors claim to actually further the rights of these
girls, who may be facing coercion at home to wear a headscarf.325
While I think that the meaning of a headscarf is not as fixed as
the French government claims, in general, discouraging the wearing
of headscarves by teaching a negative history of their meaning would,
in my view, be a permissible means of socializing children in the man-
ner the government sees fit.  However, as I’ve argued above, the rela-
tionship between socialization and liberty is not perfectly inverse.
Granting students some liberty within school actually furthers socializa-
tion goals and can prevent exit into the private sphere, where chil-
dren may be economically marginalized and unable to make the very
choices the government hopes to provide them.  Moreover, granting
some liberty can prevent backlash by students who feel isolated and
wronged by the intrusion on what they see as their identity and
community.
As I’ve argued in Section A of this Part, given that schools need to
protect some student liberty in order to socialize their students, dress
is an ideal one to protect.  Granting this accommodation, even where
the state believes that a child’s choice is anything but freely made, can
provide the necessary demonstration of good will to begin a dialogue
that empowers children within their communities.  Rather than tell-
ing children they must choose freedom in the public sphere or op-
325. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Address, Free Will, Religious Liberty, and a Partial Defense of the
French Approach to Religious Expression in Public Schools, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (2005)
(describing the French principle of laı¨cite´, or “secularism,” that supports the headscarf ban
as including “the social value of protecting each individual citizen’s intellectual and politi-
cal independence from domination by powerful social institutions such as the church”).
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pression in a private sphere, schools can reach out to students and
give them the tools to be empowered within both public and private
spheres.
D. Uniforms as Class Equalization Measure?
Public school uniforms have been promoted not only to stem
gang violence and affiliation, but also to improve school spirit and
behavior.326  Even President Clinton promoted the use of uniforms in
public schools during his time in office.327  One argument frequently
launched in favor of school uniforms is their ability to equalize stu-
dents coming from different economic means.328  By removing many
of the markers of class and status, school uniforms may remove pres-
sure on students to wear status symbol items.  They also remove pres-
sure on parents to buy their children expensive clothes.
I readily admit that this is a laudable goal and that mandatory
uniforms can, and probably do, help schools accomplish the goals of
removing class-based social pressure on children of lesser economic
means.  Of course, many actual school uniform choices do not pro-
mote a healthy anti-materialism.  Instead, those uniforms that incor-
porate tartan prints and short pleated skirts for girls are premised on
a nostalgia for the traditions of a different time and place.  However,
some school uniforms do seem to involve serious efforts by administra-
tors to choose “neutral” and simple clothing.  (Even these uniforms
often involve some sort of “business casual” dress, such as khakis and
polo shirts, rather than jeans and a t-shirt.)
Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined in Section A of this Part,
dress is an ideal area of liberty to provide students with, given that
some area of student liberty must be respected.  Dress could be carved
out relatively cleanly as a sphere of general non-interference.  Thus,
my arguments lead me to believe that the worthy goal of promoting
friendships and respect among students of different economic classes,
and helping less well-off students avoid feelings of exclusion, are bet-
ter pursued through other means.  Children cannot, of course, be
sheltered entirely from the realities of our society’s enormous wealth
326. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(a)(7) (“Schools that have adopted school uniforms
experience a ‘coming together feeling,’ greater school pride, and better behavior in and
out of the classroom.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:11-7 (West 1999) (same).
327. President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks by the President on School Uniform
Program (Feb. 24, 1996), available at http://www.ed.gov/PressReleases/02-1996/
whpr28.html.
328. E.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 670 & n.289 (citing multiple sources that make argu- R
ments in favor of uniforms because they act as “socioeconomic levelers” and “create finan-
cial savings for the students’ parents”).
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disparities.  It may be tempting for parents to shift responsibility for
what may be highly frustrating battles with children over dress onto
school administrators, but the fact that adults seek to recruit the au-
thority of the state to control their own children’s personal appear-
ance choices should serve to remind us how crucial the exercises of
these choices are to children.
VII. FREEDOM OF DRESS IN PRISONS
Another arena in which the freedom of dress is heavily regulated
is prisons.  Although federal regulations provide some prisoner free-
dom with respect to hair length and facial hair,329 state prison war-
dens do not necessarily follow the same practices.  In the State of
California, prisoners’ grooming choices are heavily restricted, and in
an explicitly gender discriminatory fashion.330  Transsexual prisoners
have sometimes had success in obtaining hormone therapy as part of
their medical treatment, but less success in obtaining access to cosmet-
ics, even though this, too, is generally part of pre-operative treat-
ment.331  Of course, prisoners have many of their liberties curtailed;
that is the nature of imprisonment—it punishes and rehabilitates via
the exercise of control over the prisoner.  And yet, we respect certain
liberties of prisoners, despite the fact that they are in prison.332  Scru-
tiny of interference with prisoner rights does not stop with a ban on
cruel and unusual punishment.  It goes further, encompassing restric-
tions on rights that “survive[ ] incarceration” and which are not ra-
tionally related to “legitimate penological interests.”333  Justice Stevens
has described this scrutiny as recognizing the ethical responsibilities
of society to treat persons as individuals worthy of dignity, even when
they are in prison.334  Perhaps part of our aversion to acts like state-
329. 28 C.F.R. §§ 551.1, .2, .4 (2006) (permitting inmates to select the hair style of per-
sonal choice and wear a mustache or beard or both, and prohibiting the Warden from
restricting an inmate’s hair length, respectively).
330. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3062 (2004) (providing different grooming restrictions
for male and female inmates).
331. See, e.g., Murray v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1716,
at *7–8 (6th Cir. Jan. 28, 1997) (per curiam) (denying transsexual prisoner’s Eighth
Amendment claim that she was entitled to receive hair and skin products).
332. E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 82, 99–100 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a
regulation prohibiting inmates from marrying).
333. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131–32 (2003). But see id. at 139–40
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing for a doctrinal approach under which only the Eighth
Amendment would limit infringement of prisoner rights, and under which the main in-
quiry would be one of state law: whether the infringement of the prisoner’s rights is part of
the punishment for the crime committed).
334. Id. at 138 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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established religion in prison, or arbitrary violations of prisoner First
Amendment rights, comes from our knowledge that what the state
does to prisoners using force, we do to ourselves using cultural coer-
cion.335  When the state refuses to allow prisoners to voice their objec-
tion to the President’s actions, but allows prisoners to voice their
support of those actions, we are afraid of what it means for the rest of
us that we let the state take sides in this way.  When the state tells
female prisoners that they cannot get married because it is bad for
them, we are afraid of what that says about our own choices concern-
ing intimate relationships.  Put less selfishly, the fact that we accept
incarceration of prisoners does not allow us to fully detach ourselves
from our shared humanity with them.
Currently, speech rights and equal protection rights are consid-
ered rights that survive incarceration, and can therefore only be in-
fringed for legitimate penological reasons, such as safety and
rehabilitation.336  If such rights survive incarceration, I argue that the
freedom of dress also survives incarceration.  Unlike the deprivation
of liberty or isolation, freedom of dress is not inconsistent with the
very concept of incarceration.  Moreover, when the state arbitrarily
restricts the ability of prisoners to experiment with their own identi-
ties, the state uses its power of violence to take a side in cultural wars,
and to impede the development of personality and identity itself.
A. The Nature of Incarceration
Because exercise of the freedom of dress is such an important
means of developing a social identity, I argue that it is not appropriate
to restrict the freedom of dress as “part of the punishment” of incar-
ceration, just as forcing a convict to change religions, political parties,
or cut off all contact with his or her family would not be acceptable as
punishment.  These activities so structure life experience that to limit
them arbitrarily is to deny the humanity of prisoners.
Such restrictions are a means of inducing conformity and disci-
pline.  That conservative and uniform dress induces submission to au-
thority explains why prison wardens, military leaders, police chiefs,
school boards, employers, and anyone else in power wish to impose
that type of dress on others.  However, not letting prisoners develop
and express political beliefs, or requiring all prisoners to subscribe to
335. See FOUCAULT, supra note 77, at 200–09 (analogizing to the Panopticon to illustrate R
the coercive effect of constant visibility).
336. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91 (restricting prison officials’ ability to prohibit prisoner
marriage); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413–14 (1974) (limiting prison officials’
ability to censor prisoner mail).
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a uniform religion, might also induce feelings of discipline and sub-
mission to authority.  The problem with unnecessarily restricting free-
dom of dress is that it fails to recognize that the prisoner, despite
being subject to punishment and rehabilitation, is still a human and
an individual, still someone with a personality that he or she must be
free to determine and develop.
However, there are elements of incarceration for which restric-
tions on dress may be necessary, such as the need to make escape
difficult, the need to confiscate items such as jewelry that are usable as
weapons, the need to quickly tell the difference between prisoners
and guards in case of riot, and the need to ensure that prisoners do
not pose health and safety risks to other prisoners, such as when pris-
oners work in the kitchen or their mode of dress poses an extreme
hygiene problem.  These needs justify restrictions on the freedom of
dress as extreme as requiring uniforms.  However, I argue that they
cannot justify all restrictions, and I therefore propose a reasonable
accommodation framework in prisons, like that which I have pro-
posed for the workplace.  Of course, the concept of undue hardship
would rightly be far broader in the context of a prison than a
workplace.
B. The Interests in Security and Identification
The interests in security and identification are of course strong in
prisons.  However, while it may be necessary to require uniforms for
prisoners as a result, it is not necessary to restrict prisoner freedom of
dress to the extreme that it is restricted in places like California.
Thus, I propose a reasonable accommodation approach for prisons.
For instance, because California prisons allow women prisoners to
wear their hair longer than men prisoners, it is clearly reasonable to
allow men to wear their hair at least as long as women may.  Use of
makeup by men can be accommodated without great expense, as can
numerous sorts of short beards.  Giving prisoners some chance to de-
velop and alter their personality vis-a`-vis others, before release, can be
accomplished by reasonable accommodation.
I do not suggest that the accommodation given prisoners who
seek to individualize their appearance need be as strong as that given
to prisoners who seek religious exemptions from dress and grooming
codes, or medical exemptions on the basis of gender identity disorder.
Because these latter claims require an affirmative assertion of a partic-
ular religious belief or transsexual gender identity, it may be easier for
prison authorities to accommodate these claims than it would be to
accommodate nonreligious and nonmedical claims, which can be du-
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plicated by large numbers of prisoners.  Thus, while prison authorities
may be able to accommodate the long hair of a Rastafarian without
undue hardship, it might be an undue hardship to accommodate ex-
tremely long hair in every single prisoner who desired it.  Because
prohibitions on long hair are often intended to prevent smuggling of
contraband in the hair,337 allowing all prisoners to have long hair
would impose much greater search costs on the prison system than
would allowing only those prisoners who are Rastafarians to wear their
hair long.338  Similarly, providing transsexual prisoners with certain
accommodations, such as access to cosmetics as part of medical treat-
ment, might impose fewer costs on prisons than providing those rights
to all prisoners.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fact that all of us wear clothes and get haircuts “may per-
haps . . . have contributed to the sometimes marginalised position that
dress is given within academia and museology.”339  But, that an activity
is commonplace should never keep legal scholars from exploring
what the law’s relationship should be to that activity.
In this Article, I have attempted to theorize a freedom of dress
and apply it to specific areas of the law.  In doing so, I have radically
departed from the typical treatment of this problem in today’s legal
scholarship as a problem of antidiscrimination law,340 as well as a gen-
eral apprehension about whether the law can ever do anything about
it.  I return to a rights-based approach to the problem because what is
at stake is the way we define ourselves in relation to the rest of soci-
ety—our identity.  Identity is not a static, immutable given, nor is it so
insubstantial as to be meaningless to human existence.  Identity is
shaped by social norms and the law, and it is a ground from which to
rally for reshaping those norms and the law.  In the consumer culture
we live in, without freedom of dress, we do not have the freedom to
continually revise, disrupt, and reform our identities; we do not have
freedom over our self-determination.
337. See, e.g., Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, 369 (6th Cir. 2005) (including pre-
vention of hiding contraband in hair among asserted correctional interests in support of
total ban on long hair for prisoners); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir.
2005) (same); Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 658 (6th Cir. 1988) (same).
338. See Hoevenaar, 422 F.3d at 369 (describing less restrictive alternatives to the war-
den’s kouplock ban such as “allowing inmates to grow their hair long, but requiring them
to be subjected to periodic hair searches,” or “permitting, on a case-by-case basis, those
inmates with a low security risk to grow a kouplock”).
339. Wilson & de la Haye, supra note 2, at 2. R
340. See sources cited supra note 6. R
